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TURNING FROM TORT TO 
ADMINISTRATION 
Richard A. Nagareda* 
Settlements of tort suits ordinarily do not make front-page 
headlines. Two recent efforts to effect class action settlements for 
workers exposed to asbestos products1 and recipients of silicone gel 
breast implants2 are hardly ordinary, however, just as asbestos and 
breast implants are not the subjects of ordinary tort suits. Instead, 
litigation over these products exemplifies the phenomenon of mass 
torts: it involves conduct alleged to be tortious and to affect large 
numbers of people by means qf a mass-marketed product - in par-
ticular, a product thought to give rise to recurring patterns of injury 
that may remain latent for years or even decades.3 
The notion that tort claims might be resolved through settle-
ment agreements is not new. The recent settlement agreements, 
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 1985, Stanford; J.D. 
1988, University of Chicago. - Ed. During the period 1991-94, the author was an associate 
with the law firm of Shea & Gardner, which represented the Center for Claims Resolution in 
the Georgine asbestos settlement discussed herein. The Center is a nonprofit organization 
that coordinates the legal representation of some 20 companies formerly involved in the as-
bestos industry. The author did not take part personally in the Georgine proceedings, how-
ever, and the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Center. A grant 
from the University of Georgia School of Law provided financial support for this paper. 
John Duffy, Anne Dupre, Robert Hillman, Paul Kurtz, John McGinnis, John Mills, Mark 
Movsesian, Alex Passantino, Michael Wells, Christen Wheeler, and Rebecca White provided 
helpful comments. 
1. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). This litigation 
originally was styled as Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc. As described in greater detail infra, 
the settlement approved by the court in Georgine reaches product liability claims of persons 
occupationally exposed to asbestos products from any of the 20 companies collectively repre-
sented by the Center for Claims Resolution. The settlement does not affect other members 
of the asbestos industry, such as Johns-Manville. Moreover, the settlement is limited to occu-
pationally exposed persons who had not sued yet in tort as of January 15, 1993, the date on 
which the settling parties submitted their agreement to the court, see Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 
257; the agreement accordingly does not reach pending claims already on file at that time in 
any forum. For ease of reference, I cite throughout this paper not only to the pertinent page 
of the Georgine opinion but also, when possible, to the relevant numbered paragraph 
thereof. 
2. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Corning 
Corp.), No. CV92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) [herein-
after Lindsey {Sept. 1, 1994)]. 
3. The same description applies to earlier mass torts, involving such products as the defo-
liant Agent Orange and the drug Bendectin. I use the locution "alleged to be" and similar 
language to clarify that at least some mass tort settlements may come at a time when issues of 
medical causation - whether the product in question actually caused injury under a prepon-
derance standard - remain unresolved. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. 
899 
900 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:899 
however, are visionary in their substance. Each seeks to replace 
traditional tort litigation with a private administrative framework. 
Their goal is to provide timely compensation to mass tort plaintiffs 
by way of streamlined claim procedures while affording defendants 
greater certainty as to their potential tort liabilities. Repose, how-
ever, does not come cheaply. For defendants, the cost of a mass 
tort settlement can run into the billions of dollars.4 On the plain-
tiffs' side, moreover, timely compensation entails the relinquish-
ment of the right to sue in the common law tort system. 
To bring about such a resolution, the recent settlements use the 
class action device in an unprecedented fashion. They are unlike 
conventional class action lawsuits in which settlement comes in the 
aftermath of discovery and other preparations for trial. Instead, 
class actions under Rule 23(b )(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have served simply as the procedural device to embody the 
settlement in a judgment that will bind future claimants - namely, 
persons exposed to the product in question but who have yet to 
suffer any ill effects.5 Specifically, class members who do not af-
firmatively opt out of the recent settlements as contemplated in 
Rule 23(b )(3) will be bound to the compensation terms set forth 
therein, at least for the duration of those agreements. 
Although both of the settlements garnered approval at the dis-
trict court level, their ultimate operation remains in the offing. 
Challenges to the asbestos settlement are likely to wind their way 
through the appellate courts for some time. In the case of the 
breast implant settlement, an unexpectedly high number of claims 
led to the demise of the original deal, which had posited a fixed sum 
for the payment of all compensation claims. Although renegoti-
ation efforts have produced a second agreement that covers some 
manufacturers, the largest of them -Dow Corning - recently de-
clared bankruptcy, with the result that tort claims against it are un-
likely to be resolved soon in any manner. 6 Commentators 
4. In its original form, the breast implant settlement entailed the commitment of over 
$4.2 billion by manufacturers toward compensation of product users. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 
1994), supra note 2, at *l. 
5. Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained upon a judicial finding 
that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3); cf. infra section III.C.2.a (discussing potential obstacles to class certification). Sub-
sections (c)(2) and (c)(3) of Rule 23, in tum, afford members of the plaintiff class the oppor-
tunity to remove themselves - to opt out - from a (b)(3) class action. 
6. See supra notes 1-2 (citing district court opinions approving the settlements for fair-
ness). A collateral challenge to the jurisdiction of the Georgine court and to its certification 
of the plaintiff class is currently pending before the Third Circuit. See Georgine v. Amchem 
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nonetheless have been quick to recognize that, whatever the ulti-
mate fate of these particular settlement agreements, the two stand 
as models for the future of mass torts. The transformation from 
tort to administration envisioned by such agreements involves what 
Peter Schuck has described aptly as "institutional evolutionism": 
the ad hoc, experimental development of alternatives to traditional 
tort litigation for the treatment of mass torts.7 The notion is not to 
tinker at the margins with the common law tort system but, instead, 
to conceive of new institutions for whole categories of mass tort 
actions. As Judge Jack Weinstein recently has observed, 
"[n]onlitigation settlements giving effective help to those who think 
they have been injured, without destroying those believed to be at 
fault, are the wave of the future."8 Indeed, with the increased at-
tention devoted to such subjects as the Norplant contraceptive, nic-
otine in tobacco products, and repetitive stress injuries,9 the 
potential field for application of mass tort settlements continues to 
expand rapidly. 
That mass tort settlements have the potential to affect the lives 
and livelihoods of many on an unprecedented scale is indisputable. 
The principal architects of these settlements, however, have not 
Prods., Inc., Nos. 94-1925 et al. (3d Cir. filed Sept. 22, 1994); infra section III.C.2. In addi-
tion, direct appeal of the district court's fairness detennination in Georgine remains to be 
had. On the problems leading to renegotiation of the breast implant settlement, see Barry 
Meier, A Judge and a Deadline: The Breast Implant Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at AB; 
Barry Meier, 3 Makers of Breast Implants Offer a Revised Settlement, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 
1995, at Al, A9 [hereinafter Meier, Revised Settlement]. Although Dow Coming has de-
clared bankruptcy, see Barnaby J. Feder, Dow Corning In Bankruptcy Over Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 16, 1995, at Al, D6, its solvent parent - Dow Chemical - remains the subject 
of active litigation with respect to breast implants, see Barry Meier, Dow Chemical Must Pay 
$10 Million in Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at A8 (describing punitive damage ver-
dict in individual tort action based upon, inter alia, the performance by Dow Chemical of 
studies on silicone for Dow Coming); see also Alison Frankel, Dow Corning Goes For Broke, 
AM. LAw., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 78-83; Barry Meier, Dow Chemical in the Center of a Storm, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. l, 1995, at C2. 
7. See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 COR-
NELL L. REv. 941, 944 (1995). 
8. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JumCE IN MAss TORT LmGATION: THE EFFECT OF 
CLAss ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OnmR MULTIPARTY DEVICES 4 (1995); see also 
Gina Kolata, 3 Companies in Landmark Accord on Lawsuits Over Breast Implants, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at Al, BlO [hereinafter Kolata, Landmark Accord] (quoting observa-
tion of Geoffrey Miller that breast implant settlement. will "be a model for future class-action 
litigation"). 
9. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y. TIMEs, May 28, 1995, 
§ 3, at 1 (describing tort liability issues surrounding the safety of Norplant); see also Castano 
v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La.) (certifying class action against tobacco 
industry on behalf of all nicotine addicted persons in the United States), appeal docketed, No. 
95-00117 (5th Cir. May 25, 1995); Steve Lohr, Vigorous Defense Stalls Injury Claims On 
Repetitive Strain, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1995, at 27 (noting that defendants have thus far suc-
ceeded in rebuffing suits for repetitive stress injuries). 
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been the courts, legislatures, or public administrative agencies, 
much less the legal academy. Instead, the key players have been 
private attorneys whose own entrepreneurial incentives potentially 
could conflict with the interests of the plaintiff class that they pur-
port to represent.10 It is this risk of agency costs - the concern 
that class counsel might be faithful to their own pocketbooks but 
unfaithful to the plaintiff class - that supports the requirement in 
Rule 23( e) that a court must pass upon the fairness of a class action 
settlement.11 The idea is that judicial review may substitute for the 
direct monitoring of counsel by the client, as is typical in traditional 
litigation on behalf of an individual plaintiff. 
My objective here is to challenge the notion that the recent mass 
tort settlements - for all their novel qualities in the mass tort area 
- are truly sui generis in the law. Rather, I contend that the rise of 
such settlements in tort mirrors the development of public adminis-
trative agencies earlier in this century - that, in both instances, 
powerful new institutions emerged outside preexisting channels of 
control to wield significant power over human lives and resources. 
I argue that courts usefully may draw upon familiar doctrines of 
judicial review in administrative law to form a conceptual frame-
work for their analysis of mass tort settlements under Rule 23( e ). 
In other words, not only should the law turn from tort to adminis-
tration in terms of the compensation system for mass tort plaintiffs, 
it also should make a similar shift in perspective when it comes to 
10. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alterna· 
tive Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1587, 1620 
(1995) (remarking that, in creating the recent mass tort settlements, "plaintiff and defense 
attorneys clearly have taken control of the dispute resolution process"). 
Scholarship on entrepreneurial litigation by plaintiff class counsel has its roots in the con-
text of corporate and securities litigation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plain· 
tiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law 
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney]; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of En· 
trepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role]. 
As discussed infra, these commentators recently have extended their respective analyses to 
mass tort settlements. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort 
Class Action, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 
80 CORNELL L. REv. 851 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, A 
Market Approach to Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 909 (1995) [hereinafter 
Macey & Miller, Market Approach]. 
11. The requirement of judicial approval extends to class actions generally, not merely to 
those involving mass torts. The case for judicial review of settlements in the mass tort area is 
especially strong, however, given the sweeping effect of such agreements. See infra section 
11.B (discussing the reasons for divergence between the interests of class counsel in a mass 
tort settlement and the interests of class members). 
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judicial review. Such an administrative perspective is not without 
its own limitations, however, and recognition of those constraints 
may point the way toward an agenda for further developments in 
public law. 
In Part I, I set forth the distinctive characteristics of mass torts 
and their implications for the economic structure of the mass tort 
bar. I then relate the recent mass tort settlements to developments 
during the 1980s, from the recognition of innovative theories of tort 
liability and damages to the use of statistical methods to facilitate 
the disposition, in aggregate, of large numbers of tort actions. The 
recent settlements represent an attempt to overcome the inadequa-
cies of these earlier innovations. Although there remains some de-
gree of variation, one may discern an emerging pattern of attributes 
for mass tort settlements, and I enumerate them with attention to 
their institutional advantages and the prospects for their future ap-
plication. Readers already familiar with the history of mass tort liti-
gation and the structure of the recent settlements simply may 
peruse this Part. 
Next, in Part II, I explore the implications of the class action 
device for judicial review of mass tort settlements. Specifically, I 
detail the need for review to safeguard the fairness of such settle-
ments in the face of the agency cost problems engendered by the 
entrepreneurial incentives of class counsel. As I discuss, these 
problems stem from the possibility that counsel for the plaintiff 
class may wish to "reinvest" the fees gained from the class repre-
sentation in the development of some new, uncharted field of mass 
tort litigation. 
In Part III, I explain how doctrines developed for judicial review 
of rulemaking by public administrative agencies form a coherent 
framework for judicial review of mass tort settlements under Rule 
23( e ). Specifically, the courts should conceive of such review along 
the lines of the "hard look" doctrine, which demands that adminis-
trative agencies provide reasoned explanations for their actions in 
light of criticism from interested parties received through a notice-
and-comment process. Indeed, current law contains the rudimen-
tary elements of such a system, albeit without recognition of its ad-
ministrative law roots. 
I demonstrate how this administrative perspective responds to 
the major problems that other commentators - principally, Profes-
sor John Coffee - have identified with respect to the recent mass 
tort settlements. In Professor Coffee's view, the courts should de-
velop what amount to rigid, per se rules for the structure of mass 
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tort settlements and the selection of class counsel. As I show, that 
approach not only stems from erroneous premises regarding the re-
cent settlements but also would represent a misguided and over-
broad response to the problem of agency costs. 
I then discuss the normative limitations of such an administra-
tive perspective. Although a conception drawn from administrative 
law does make for a workable system of judicial review, such a per-
spective fails to legitimize the sweeping power that private counsel 
exercise through such agreements. Public administrative agencies 
derive their authority to effect binding regulation by virtue of 
rulemaking power delegated from Congress; no one, in contrast, 
has delegated comparable power to the mass tort bar. As a result, 
unresolved questions continue to surround mass tort settlements re-
garding the propriety of class certification and the basis for personal 
jurisdiction over future claimants within the plaintiff class. 
To address this crisis of legitimacy, I offer in Part IV an agenda 
for public law - one that would preserve the advantages of private 
negotiation over the appropriate compensation terms for mass 
torts, but that would draw upon the unique regulatory authority of 
government to give binding force to those terms. Such a regime 
would not entail the creation of a vast new public bureaucracy. 
Rather, Congress should draw upon the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act of 199012 as a model for a statutory framework in which public 
administrative agencies would act as the facilitators of private 
agreements to resolve mass torts and the courts would continue to 
safeguard mass tort plaintiffs against agency costs. 
I. TURNING FROM TORT 
A. The Character of Mass Torts 
The recent class action settlements do not represent the first ef-
fort to deal with the challenges of mass torts, both as a matter of 
tort doctrine and as a problem of judicial administration. Rather, 
they simply are the latest stage in an ongoing effort to adapt legal 
institutions to the distinctive features of this phenomenon. Here, I 
discuss these features, with special emphasis upon their implications 
for the structure and economic incentives of the mass tort bar. 
12. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 {1994). 
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1. Breaking the Traditional Mold 
The classic tort cases of the common law stem from idiosyn-
cratic events: an errant cricket ball konks Bessie Stone;13 a railway 
scale becomes dislodged and strikes Helen Palsgraf when a nearby 
passenger drops a bundle of fireworks;14 waitress Gl~dys Escola 
suffers lacerations to her hand from an exploding Coke bottle.15 
This is the stuff that introduces budding lawyers to the common law 
of tort. However extraordinary the facts of these cases may seem, 
their fundamental structure is both relatively simple and typical of 
traditional tort litigation: there is a single, identified plaintiff who 
claims to be hurt here and now by a specific defendant and the 
resolution of the plaintiff's claim - whether she receives damages 
and, if so, in what amount - has only an indirect bearing, at best, 
upon other pending tort suits.16 
Mass torts diverge from this familiar pattern. They characteris-
tically involve large numbers of persons who claim to suffer injuries 
that come in recurring patterns. The number of people involved 
and the recurring nature of their injuries are interrelated. Both 
stem from the uniform character of products in a modem industrial 
economy. Where manufacturers have marketed a product on a na-
tionwide basis and that product later proves to be harmful, it is 
likely that adverse consequences will occur in patterns, given the 
fundamental similarities in human physiology from person to per-
son. Thus, for example, the maladies of persons who inhaled asbes-
tos fibers into their lungs come in a handful of distinctive types.17 
Likewise, one readily may place into a few discrete categories the 
afflictions that breast implant recipients assert.18 
Sheer numbers, however, are not the defining feature of mass 
torts. Indeed, commentators use a different term - "mass acci-
dent" - to describe tortious conduct that happens to strike large 
numbers of people in similar ways. The most familiar torts of this 
variety consist of localized disasters associated with some physical 
13. Bolton v. Stone, 1951 App. Cas. 850. 
14. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
15. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
16. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TruAr.: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE 
COURTS 6-9 (enlarged ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL]; Glen 0. 
Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 1481, 1487-
88 (1992). 
17. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 269 ('ll 51) (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
18. See Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice at exh. D, In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp.), No. CV92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994), at exh. D [hereinafter Lindsey Notice]. 
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structure: a fire at a particular hotel, the crash of a particular air-
plane, and the like.19 By contrast, mass torts add two further com-
plications - one temporal, the other geographic. 
The physical impairments typically produced by an errant 
cricket ball, a falling railway scale, a hotel fire, or a plane crash 
become apparent immediately after some discrete event. The con-
sequences of mass torts, however, are insidious in nature: mass 
torts do not cause broken bones; instead, they characteristically 
produce cancer or nonmalignant conditions that do not strike im-
mediately but develop quietly in the body over an extended pe-
riod.20 As a result, mass torts characteristically entail a latency 
period of many years or even decades between exposure to the 
harmful product and the onset of physical impairment.21 To take 
but one pertinent illustration, medical experts consider the latency 
period for asbestos-related lung cancer to be approximately twelve 
years.22 This waiting period gives rise to a macabre lottery: only 
some of those exposed to a harmful product ultimately will suffer 
impairment, whereas other exposed persons - perhaps even the 
majority - may suffer no impairment at all. In the meantime, how-
ever, all those exposed must watch and wait. 
Exposed persons are not the only ones who must live with un-
certainty. Defendants likewise cannot know the full extent of their 
liability because the impairments suffered by exposed persons are 
dispersed over time.23 Until the relevant latency periods have run 
their course, the defendants' potential liability for damages in tort 
remains undetermined. At most, science can assign to exposed per-
sons a relative risk factor - an estimate of the probability that they 
eventually will develop cancer, for example, relative to the risk of 
19. See David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons 
from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695, 696 n.4, 716-17 (1989); see also WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 8, at 16-17. 
20. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public 
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 91 HARV. L. REV. 851, 852, 919 (1984). 
21. I use the term "impairment" in a medical sense to refer to a clinically verifiable dimi-
nution in some bodily function - for instance, a reduction in lung capacity in a worker 
exposed to asbestos. "Impairment" thus is distinct from the legal concept of "injury." Tort 
plaintiffs may be regarded as injured in a legal sense based upon their exposure to a harmful 
substance, even though they have yet to suffer - and may never suffer - impairment. See 
infra note 113 (explaining that exposure alone may constitute injury in fact for purposes of 
standing). 
22. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 275 (q[ 83) (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(approving use of 12-year latency period as criterion for compensation under asbestos settle-
ment agreement). 
23. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 722-23. 
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that disease in an unexposed person.24 Even those who initially suf-
fer some degree of physical impairment may find that their condi-
tion worsens over time. 
As if temporal dispersion were not enough of a problem, mass 
tort plaintiffs also are dispersed geographically.25 The focus of liti-
gation is not upon a particular place but, instead, upon the defend-
ants' distribution of products throughout the national economy. 
Litigation against mass tortfeasors thus proceeds in both the federal 
courts and various state courts, in jurisdictions with generous juries 
and those without. 
The large number of claimants, temporal dispersion, and geo-
graphic dispersion make for a devastating combination for the judi-
cial system. The potential result is that thousands of individual 
lawsuits may proceed over the span of many years in many different 
fora, leading to lengthy delays. The asbestos litigation provides the 
most vivid and well-documented illustration of these problems, with 
plaintiffs having to wait nearly three years, on average, for resolu-
tion of their individual actions in tort.26 
In the meantime, the recurring patterns that these individual 
claims exhibit lead, over time,· to a kind of stock market. As 
Deborah Hensler and Mark Peterson have observed, the values of 
individual claims arising from a mass tort are interdependent: 
"[C]laims are so similar that the prospective value of many claims 
will rise or fall sharply with a large plaintiff award, a defense verdict 
or even a signal discovery event or evidentiary decision in a single 
case that is part of the mass of pending claims."27 The implications 
of such a stock market become clear when one considers the mech-
anism by which mass tort claims are brought into the tort system for 
adjudication. 
24. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of 
Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 234-37 (1993). 
25. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 721-22. 
26. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 279 ('l[ 105). 
27. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Liti-
gation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 967 (1993); see also Coffee, Class 
Wars, supra note 10, at 1359; Hensler, supra note 10, at 1596. Thus, for example, the value of 
mass tort claims remains intimately linked to the debate in evidence law over the appropriate 
standards for admission of expert scientific testimony on novel theories of causation. See 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (rejecting the view that 
admissibility of expert scientific testimony depends exclusively upon its acceptance within the 
scientific community); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litiga-
tion, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 2 (1995) (noting that Daubert "forces to the forefront ... the 
problem of how to satisfactorily dispose of lawsuits involving thousands of plaintiffs in the 
face of genuine scientific uncertainty regarding the toxicity or safety of the litigated substance 
or product"). 
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2. The Mass Tort Bar 
On the plaintiffs' side, contingent fee arrangements have long 
served as the underwriting device for tort litigation.28 The effect, of 
course, is to give plaintiffs' counsel a direct economic stake in the 
amount of compensation ultimately recovered by their clients.29 
For the plaintiffs' bar,30 a successful mass tort claim - like any 
other tort action - turns upon proof of the familiar common law 
elements of duty, breach, causation, and damage. The first element 
is, by now, straightforward and essentially costless for a plaintiffs' 
law firm. Mass tort litigation typically stems from the contention 
that the defendants failed to warn persons exposed to their product 
of some hidden health risk about which the defendants knew or, at 
the very least, should have known. Workers, for example, point to 
the asbestos industry's failure to warn them about the risk of 
asbestos-related disease.31 Breast implant recipients allege that 
manufacturers failed to disclose their product's potential to cause 
autoimmune disorders.32 In the aftermath of the products liability 
revolution, there can be no doubt of the legal obligation to warn of 
such risks.33 
28. See JAMES s. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, Cosrs AND COMPENSATION PAID IN 
ToRT LmoATION 96 tbl. (1986) (showing that 96% of individual plaintiffs in tort litigation 
paid counsel on a contingent fee basis). 
29. See Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contin-
gent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (1970). 
30. I use the term "plaintiffs' bar" to refer to law firms in the business of representing 
mass tort plaintiffs. That a given firm should ally itself with one particular side in case after 
case stems from at least two factors: the ethical limitations upon the representation of clients 
with conflicting interests, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1992), 
and the economies of scale in mass tort litigation, see infra notes 34-50 and accompanying 
text. 
31. The leading case to recognize a duty to warn in the asbestos context remains Borel v. 
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 
(1974). For a sample complaint centered upon the failure to warn and drafted by a leading 
asbestos litigator, see FREDERICK M. BARON, HANDLING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CASES 
§ 8.14, at <J(<Jl 17-20 (rev. ed. 1989). 
32. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 992-98 (discussing trials in early breast 
implant cases). 
33. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes strict liability upon the 
seller of any product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1964). Comment j to the same section 
clarifies that a defective condition may arise from the absence of a warning about unobvious 
health risks when the seller "has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed 
human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of ••• the danger." Id. § 402A cmt. j; see 
also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 32:1 (3d ed. 1993) (same). The wisdom of 
such a standard of liability is a subject beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, 
I take as given the principles of product liability law that underlie the claims of mass tort 
plaintiffs. 
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Beyond the finding of a legal duty, however, the building of a 
winning case becomes more difficult. Counsel must develop what 
one might call "generic assets" on the elements of breach and cau-
sation and "specific assets" in the form of clients who have suffered 
damage. As the nomenclature suggests, generic assets consist of ev-
idence that can be used repeatedly in all cases involving a particular 
product or, at least, a substantial number of such cases. On the 
breach element, counsel must prove that a particular defendant 
failed to discharge its legal duty to warn - at the very least, by not 
disclosing some risk known in the medical literature to be present 
in the product34 or perhaps even by affirmatively suppressing infor-
mation on health risks or by taking part in a civil conspiracy with 
other industry members who engaged in such misconduct.35 To 
make such a showing, as a practical matter, counsel must engage in 
a process of historical re-creation. Specifically, counsel will need to 
ascertain the state of the medical literature at the time of the cli-
ent's exposure - a task likely to involve expert witnesses versed in 
the development of medical knowledge in the relevant field over 
time - and to determine, through civil discovery, precisely what 
the defendants knew about the product and when. Once assem-
bled, however, such information forms a generic asset that can be 
deployed in all cases involving the defendant company. 
In addition, evidence of general causation is also necessary. 
Counsel must be able to show that the product in question is capa-
ble of causing injury in at least some individuals,36 and here, again, 
the involvement of medical experts will be crucial. Moreover, proof 
of causation also may entail what one might call "exposure match-
ing" - the assembly of evidence through civil discovery to show 
that a particular plaintiff was exposed to a particular defendant's 
wares.37 These efforts are likely to spill over to the cases of other 
plaintiffs where a common nexus of exposure exists: proof that one 
worker at a given factory was exposed to the asbestos products of a 
34. See Borel, 493 F .2d at 1089 ("[T]he manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of 
an expert .••• [This] means that at a minimum he must keep abreast of scientific knowledge, 
discoveries, and advances and is presumed to know what is imparted thereby."). 
35. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 468-70 (NJ. 1986) (awarding puni-
tive damages for suppression of information on asbestos risks); see also In re North Dakota 
Personal Injury Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1096-97 (D.N.D. 1990) {finding a civil 
conspiracy to suppress information on asbestos risks among members of a trade association). 
36. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 {6th Cir. 1988) {distinguish-
ing between general causation and specific causation); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 
MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1227-28 {1987) (same). 
37. See GERAID W. BoSToN & M. STUART MADDEN, LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
Toxic TORTS 403-09 (1994) {discussing problem of indeterminate defendants). 
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given supplier, for example, will go a long way toward demonstrat-
ing that others at the same site were similarly exposed. 
Quite simply, the development of generic assets takes money. 
Expert witnesses generally do not work for free - indeed, some 
may regard consultation as a major source of income - nor do law 
firm associates or paralegals tasked with the heavy lifting of civil 
discovery. Given the use of contingent fee arrangements, more-
over, counsel will see no financial returns until the first plaintiff re-
ceives compensation in tort. In other words, counsel who wish to 
blaze a new path of mass tort litigation must incur the fixed costs of 
developing generic assets long before they obtain a favorable ver-
dict or settlement. In fact, in order to deal with the cash flow 
problems that this phenomenon engenders, counsel in the Agent 
Orange litigation entered into a contractual agreement whereby 
multiple "investors" from within the plaintiffs' bar shared the bill 
for litigation costs.38 A similar arrangement supports current ef-
forts to undertake sweeping discovery against the tobacco industry 
concerning the alleged manipulation of nicotine.39 
Ultimate recovery in mass tort litigation, moreover, depends 
upon proof that the product in question has harmed some particular 
individual in some way - namely, that there has been both specific 
causation and damage.40 Generic assets do counsel no good, in 
other words, without specific assets in the form of a client - pref-
erably many clients. As a result, the members of the plaintiffs' bar 
who have "invested" to develop a valuable array of generic assets 
likely will be eager to maximize their return by searching for addi-
tional clients with colorable mass tort claims. The goal is to spread 
the fixed costs of generic assets over ever more units and, in so 
doing, to take advantage of economies of scale.41 
38. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987} ( describ· 
ing agreement whereby six passive investors contributed $200,000 each "as a means of raising 
the capital necessary for the maintenance and continuation of the lawsuit"). 
39. See Glenn Collins, A Tobacco Case's Legal Buccaneers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at 
Dl ("Close to 60 prominent law firms known for so-called toxic torts are contributing 
$100,000 each to a consortium, filling an annual war chest of nearly $6 million."). 
40. See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200 (Upon proof of general causation, "it became the re-
sponsibility of each individual plaintiff to show that his or her specific injuries or damages 
were proximately caused by ingestion or otherwise using the [water contaminated by defend· 
ants]. We cannot emphasize this point strongly enough because generalized proofs will not 
suffice to prove individual damages."). 
41. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 1045. This is not to say, of course, that 
lawyers ordinarily have no incentive to drum up new business. One of the primary objectives 
of any litigation practice is the development of a body of expertise in a particular area that 
will lead, in tum, to future business. The point here is simply that the nature of generic assets 
in mass torts makes them especially transferable from one case to another - much more so 
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What little public information exists on mass tort plaintiffs' law 
firms tends to support these predictions from economics. The pre-
cise financial structure of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar remains 
shrouded in secrecy; law firms, after all, do not publish annual re-
ports in the manner of publicly held corporations. There, nonethe-
less, is some public information. For example, through lengthy civil 
discovery, one of the pioneers in the asbestos litigation - Ronald 
Motley of the Barnwell, South Carolina firm of Ness, Motley, 
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole - succeeded in accumulating dev-
astating evidence against the asbestos industry on the elements of 
breach and general causation. Upon doing so, Motley reached out 
to develop ties to other plaintiffs' firms in all fifty states that were 
able to come forward with streams of new asbestos clients.42 
Specifically, Motley embarked upon the building of what 
amount to franchise arrangements: the Ness, Motley firm would 
handle proof of the defendant companies' liability; local firms -
the suppliers of specific assets - would deal with proof of the par-
ticular plaintiffs' exposure histories and injuries; and the two firms 
would share the fees from successful claims. 43 The ingeniousness of 
this arrangement lies in the ability of Ness, Motley to spread the 
fixed costs associated with its early development of generic assets 
while, at the same time, placing upon local counsel - as the fran-
chisee - much of the marginal cost needed to develop the claims 
of individual plaintiffs. Indeed, similar franchise arrangements 
have come to be used by Motley's longtime rival within the asbestos 
plaintiffs' bar, Frederick Baron of the Dallas law firm of Baron & 
Budd.44 
These sorts of franchise arrangements are not the only device 
for cost spreading available to the mass tort plaintiffs' bar. Rather, 
the bar not only may rely upon its own efforts, it also may draw 
upon nonlawyer intermediaries such as labor unions and doctors 
who have ideological or business interests of their own in assisting 
with the identification of potential tort claimants. For example, la-
than a generalized expertise in a particular field of litigation - and accentuates the incentive 
for cost spreading. 
42. See Karen Dillon, Only $1.5 Million a Year, AM. LAWYER, Oct. 1989, at 38, 40-41 
(profiling Motley's emergence as the "asbestos king"). 
43. See id. 
44. See Gary Taylor, Outspoken Texan, Baron Establishes Toxic Tort Domain, LEGAL 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1983, at 1, 11 {discussing Baron's use of referrals from other plaintiffs' law 
firms after his early success in establishing the liability of asbestos companies). Ironically, as 
detailed later, Baron has come to be Motley's fiercest critic in connection with the Georgine 
asbestos settlement. See infra section III.B.2.b.ii {analyzing Baron's objections to the 
Georgine settlement). 
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bor unions joined forces with the plaintiffs' bar to conduct mass 
screenings of their members in order to identify new asbestos cli-
ents.45 Likewise, at least some doctors have obtained lucrative fees 
by diagnosing illnesses in breast implant recipients.46 
The distinctive features of mass torts not only influence the eco-
nomic structure of plaintiffs' law firms, they also have consequences 
for the merits of cases brought into the tort system. In a world in 
which tort suits are largely one-shot deals, where assets developed 
for one case are not readily transferable to another, the rational 
strategy for a plaintiffs' law firm is to select those cases that offer 
the largest expected recoveries after subtracting litigation costs.47 
In the traditional tort world, "good" cases - individuals seriously 
harmed by conduct that counsel may readily show to be tortious -
represent the ideal for the plaintiffs' lawyer. In the parlance of 
sports :fishermen, the goal is to keep the big fish for frying and to 
throw the little ones back.48 
Such a selective approach makes sense for relatively immature 
mass torts, where plaintiffs' counsel has incentive to put forward the 
most grievously injured and most sympathetic clients as a vehicle 
through which to establish favorable precedents on contested is-
sues: for instance, on the details of how specific defendants 
breached their duty to warn and on principles of general causation. 
Over time, however, areas of successful mass tort litigation become 
mature: issues of breach and general causation are disputed less 
frequently as the harmful character of the product and the defend-
ants' responsibility therefor become increasingly well established, 
and lawsuits tend to focus instead upon individualized questions of 
specific causation.49 At this more advanced stage, when the basics 
of the defendants' liability have taken root, it should come as no 
45. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 1023; Bill Richards & Barry Meier, Widen-
ing Horizons: Lawyers Lead Hunt for New Groups of Asbestos Victims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 
1987, at 1. 
46. See Gina Kolata, A Case of Justice, or a Total Travesty?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at 
Dl, D5; Gina Kolata & Barry Meier, Implant Lawsuits Create A Medical Rush to Cash In, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al, BB. 
47. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 889-91 (discussing economics of conven-
tional tort litigation on behalf of plaintiffs}. 
48. For a similar nomenclature describing the divergent strategies pursued by plaintiffs' 
law finns, see Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 
1821, 1827-32 (1995). 
49. The concept of a "mature" mass tort is developed in McGovern, supra note 48, at 
1841-43; and Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 
659 (1989). Cf. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 263 ('ll 16) (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(noting that, by the mid-1980s, "[t]he fundamental legal theories and liability cases against 
various [asbestos] defendants had been established"). 
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surprise that mass tort pioneers like Motley have put, aside a tradi-
tional :fisherman approach in favor of a high-volume, low-margin 
strategy explicable largely as a cost-spreading device - an "A&P 
approach as opposed to the Bergdorf Goodman approach."50 
When the defendants come to look like sitting ducks and when 
the cost of presenting additional claims lies simply in the identifica-
tion of new clients - perhaps with the help of interested in-
termediaries - the incentive is to bring into the tort system 
increasingly marginal claims: not just' those plaintiffs who are the 
most seriously impaired but· anyone with a colorable claim for com-
pensation. Though of minimal value on an individual basis, such 
claims have the potential to amount, in aggregate, to a significant 
vehicle for cost spreading by a plaintiffs' firm laden with fixed costs. 
Indeed, apart from their substantive merit, such claims have a nui-
sance value because the mass tort plaintiffs' bar ultimately can 
threaten to put defendants through the burden of trial in thousands 
of cases.51 
The asbestos litigation offers a striking illustration of this phe-
nomenon. Estimates indicate that pleural cases - claims of per-
sons with minute changes in the tissue of their lungs, as revealed on 
x-rays, but who do not currently and who may never suffer impair-
ment of their lung functions - constitute as much as one-half of 
newly filed asbestos claims.52 Not surprisingly, as discussed in de-
tail later, the handling of such cases has formed the principal point 
of contention between the asbestos plaintiffs' bar and defense 
counsel.53 
SO. Dillon, supra note 42, at 40 (quoting mass tort plaintiffs' lawyer Stanley Levy's char-
acterization of the Ness, Motley firm); see also Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1365 
(contrasting "boutique firms" and "wholesalers"). 
51. Writing on the economic structure of litigation generally, David Rosenberg and 
Steven Shaven describe a scenario "where the plaintiff's case is meritorious but he would still 
be unwilling to go to trial because the costs of litigation would exceed the expected judg-
ment." David Rosenberg & Steven Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their 
Nuisance Value, 5 INTL REv. L. & EcoN. 3, 5 (1985). As these commentators demonstrate, 
the plaintiff still will find it profitable to file such a suit when the potential defense costs from 
a trial exceed the plaintiff's filing costs. From the plaintiff's standpoint, the objective is to 
capture these defense costs in the form of a settlement. See id. In the mass tort context, the 
ability of plaintiff's counsel to file thousands of such claims, if anything, increases their nui-
sance value. 
52. See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Cri-
sis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 393 (1993). 
53. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 266 ('ll 32) (noting that treatment of pleural cases formed 
a major stumbling block for settlement negotiations); infra sections I.C.2.c (recognizing that a 
distinctive feature of mass tort settlements lies in their substitution of noncash benefits, pri-
marily a kind of insurance policy against the risk of future impairment, in lieu of cash com-
pensation for persons who are not presently impaired), III.B.2.b.ii (discussing the difference 
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As commentators have long recognized, large corporate defend-
ants in traditional tort litigation have both the incentive and the 
:financial resources to wear down plaintiffs through obstruction-
ism.s4 In the mass tort context, the interdependence of claim values 
reinforces these preexisting disincentives to settle. Defendants can-
not hope to pay settlements in cases of marginal merit in order to 
put the whole matter to rest. Instead, given the temporal dispersion 
of claims, such action carries the risk of increasing the value of simi-
lar claims in the relevant mass tort stock market. And that would 
only call forth more effort from plaintiffs' lawyers, at the margin, to 
identify such claims. From the defendants' standpoint, then, settle-
ment is attractive only to the extent that it does not merely resolve 
pending cases but, in addition, provides assurance that such action 
will not result in a deluge of marginal cases.ss 
The strategy of mass marketers within the plaintiffs' bar and the 
fears of defendants make for a paralyzing combination. Given the 
investment necessary to develop generic assets, mass marketers 
have an especially powerful economic incentive to bring large num-
bers of claims into the tort litigation system, including marginal 
claims. At the same time, defendants have little incentive to re-
solve those claims expeditiously, at least in the absence of some 
assurance about the future. Indeed, the influx of marginal claims 
simply reinforces defendants' fears that any movement in the direc-
tion of compromise will spell disaster. In a world in which mass tort 
claims are numerous but in which courts are not, this is a prescrip-
tion for deadlock within the judicial system. 
B. Partial Solutions 
The challenge that mass torts pose certainly has not gone unno-
ticed by the courts. Quite the contrary, during the past decade, 
courts have sought to accommodate the common law tort system to 
some of the distinctive features of mass torts. Specifically, courts 
have effected changes in substantive theories of recovery to address 
the temporal dispersion of mass tort claims and have experimented 
with various techniques for consolidation and aggregation in order 
to deal with the sheer volume of claims. Although far from defini-
in treatment between pleural cases within the Georgine settlement class and pleural cases left 
outside of the class). 
54. See Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 904-05; infra section I.B.2 (discussing the deploy-
ment of such tactics by asbestos defendants in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 
(E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995)). 
55. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 1603. 
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tively solving the problem, these changes stand as the intellectual 
forerunners of the recent mass tort settlements. 
1. Risk-Based Theories 
Courts have developed risk-based theories of liability and dam-
ages designed to reconcile traditional tort litigation with the long 
latency periods characteristic of mass torts. These risk-based theo-
ries, in essence, seek to overcome problems of temporal dispersion 
by enabling persons exposed to a harmful product to sue immedi-
ately, based simply upon the fact of exposure, without the need to 
show the kind of physical impairment that may take years to mani-
fest itself. Specifically, during the 1980s, common law courts recog-
nized actions predicated upon the increased risk of some future 
impairment or upon the mental distress occasioned by the involun-
tary bearing of such risk - often described as "fear of cancer" 
claims.56 The same era saw the development of the damage remedy 
of medical monitoring, whereby defendants could be required to 
pay the cost of affording exposed persons ongoing medical care to 
facilitate the early detection and treatment of any resulting 
impairment.57 
Though helpful, risk-based theories remain only partial solu-
tions. First, to guard against a flood of claims based upon the slight-
est increase in risk, some leading decisions have restricted increased 
risk and fear of cancer claims to situations in which the plaintiff can 
demonstrate a likelihood of future impairment.58 The effect of this 
limitation is to restrict the applicability of these risk-based theories 
in the mass tort area, where the increase in risk - though substan-
tial when distributed over large numbers of persons - may not be 
so great as to enable an individual plaintiff to satisfy a preponder-
ance standard. Second, in at least some jurisdictions, statutes of 
limitation and claim-preclusion principles may combine to induce 
an unimpaired plaintiff to sue prematurely on a risk-based theory 
56. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204-06 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-15 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 478 U.S. 
1022 (1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 294-97, 305-08 (N.J. 1987). 
57. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-52 (3d Cir. 1990); Potter 
v. Firestone 'Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821-25 (Cal. 1993); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308-15. 
Medical monitoring is useful, of course, only when early detection reduces the risk or severity 
of eventual impairment. Cf. U.S. PREVENTIVE SERvs. TASK FoRCE, GumE TO CLINICAL 
PREVENTIVE SERVICES: AN ASSESSMENT OF TiiE EFFECTIVENESS OF 169 INTERVENTIONS 67-
70 (1989) (recommending against medical monitoring for lung cancer on the ground that 
early detection does not decrease mortality rates). 
58. See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1204-05; Potter, 863 P.2d at 816. 
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but then prevent that plaintiff from bringing a subsequent lawsuit in 
the event that impairment actually occurs.59 
The foregoing problems are not intrinsic to risk-based theories. 
One could hypothesize a legal system that recognizes such theories 
even absent a likelihood of impairment and that eases the interac-
tion between such theories and other legal doctrines. There is, 
however, a more fundamental shortcoming of risk-based theories as 
a prescription for mass torts: they do nothing to address the sheer 
number of claims. Indeed, they exacerbate problems of judicial ad-
ministration to the extent that they succeed in bringing into the tort 
system the claims of asymptomatic persons in addition to those 
predicated upon some actual, present-day impairment. Un-
restricted recognition of risk-based theories would play neatly into 
the incentives for cost spreading by the mass marketers of the plain-
tiffs' bar. Such firms could spread their fixed costs more quickly by 
obtaining compensation for large numbers of claims based upon ex-
posure alone, without having to wait years for some fraction of the 
exposed population to manifest impairment. This does not mean 
that risk-based theories are necessarily a bad idea. Instead, the 
point is that efforts to tinker with liability and damage principles 
within the framework of traditional tort litigation are not them-
selves enough to deal with the challenge that mass torts pose. 
Change must come in that framework itself. 
2. Judicial Consolidation and Aggregation 
In addition to new substantive theories, courts have experi-
mented with procedural mechanisms to address the geographic dis-
persion of tort claims as well as their daunting numbers. 
Consolidation techniques speak to the former problem by seeking 
to gather mass tort claims in a single forum. In the case of an insol-
vent defendant, jurisdictional statutes in bankruptcy provide for the 
consolidation of all claims against the debtor in a single federal 
court to facilitate an orderly liquidation.60 With respect to solvent 
defendants, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL 
Panel) has authority to consolidate pending federal lawsuits in a 
59. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances 
Litigation, 16 CAL. L. REv. 965, 984-87, 1002 (1988). 
60. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334 (1994). The bankruptcy context has seen the creation of 
administrative compensation schemes for persons injured by the asbestos products of Johns-
Manville and those harmed by the Dalkon Shield. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos 
Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d 
Cir. 1992), modified on rehg., 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); In re A.H. Robins Co., 85 B.R. 373 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988), affd., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989). 
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single judicial district for purposes of discovery.61 Seeking to build 
upon this example, the American Law Institute has recently pro-
posed a system for consolidation of mass tort claims in the federal 
system through the mechanism of interdistrict transfers.62 
Jurisdictional constraints limit these techniques of consolidation. 
Apart from the special case of bankruptcy, consolidation mecha-
nisms like the MDL Panel can reach only litigation within the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. As the duty to warn in 
tort has long been a creature of common law, federal jurisdiction in 
the area is limited to diversity cases. Claims that fail the jurisdic-
tional requirement of complete diversity must proceed in state 
court, beyond the reach of the MDL Panel. More fundamentally, 
consolidation techniques are only the beginning of a solution, albeit 
an important one.63 Even if the courts somehow could gather all 
pending litigation - both federal and state - into a single forum, 
the question would remain what to do with it once it is there. 
One possibility involves judicial aggregation of mass tort claims. 
Traditional tort litigation - which tends to treat each lawsuit as a 
unique event - may be a costly form of overkill where claims fall 
into recurring patterns. Traditional tort litigation may serve a use-
ful role in establishing a baseline for compensation, but such an 
elaborate method of dispute resolution need not be used to general-
ize the results to other, similar cases. Specifically, aggregative tech-
niques can draw upon statistical principles to determine 
compensation levels for whole categories of medical conditions 
based upon the outcomes of trials in a limited sample of individual 
cases. 
The leading decision to discuss this technique - Cimino v. 
Raymark Industries64 - arose from the consolidation of thousands 
of individual asbestos suits brought in the Eastern District of Texas. 
In Cimino, several members of the asbestos industry had adopted 
what District Judge Parker described as a "fortress mentality," as-
serting a right to individual trials in each case in order "to repeat-
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994). 
62. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND ANALYSIS § 3.08 (1994). For a survey of this and other proposals for civil proce-
dure refonn in connection with mass torts, see William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial 
Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Co-
ordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 
1529 (1995). 
63. As discussed infra, the MDL Panel's consolidation of pending mass tort claims may 
facilitate private negotiation. See infra section I.C.1. 
64. 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995). 
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edly contest . . . every contestable issue involving the same 
products, the same warnings, and the same conduct."65 In taldng 
this stance, the defense drew support from an earlier appellate deci-
sion in the Cimino litigation, in which the Fifth Circuit had reaf-
firmed a principle from traditional tort litigation: namely, that 
defendants must be afforded the opportunity to contest specific is-
sues of causation - whether each particular plaintiff was exposed 
to the defendants' products and the extent of each plaintiff's dam-
ages - before being held liable. 66 
Faced with the prospect of individualized trials on exposure and 
damages, Judge Parker lamented that, even if he "could somehow 
close thirty cases a month, it would take six and one-half years to 
try these cases," not to mention the additional claims expected to 
be filed in the interim.67 As an alternative to such protracted litiga-
tion, Judge Parker conducted two initial phases of a consolidated 
trial to resolve, respectively, the defectiveness of the defendants' 
products and the extent to which the various work sites in question 
involved exposure to each defendant's wares.68 The major innova-
tion took place at the third phase of trial, where Judge Parker di-
vided the consolidated cases into five disease categories based upon 
the plaintiffs' asserted injuries. Within each category, a random 
sample of cases received full-scale jury trials, whereupon the aver-
age verdict for each disease category was deemed to constitute the 
damage award for the remaining plaintiffs69 - in effect, mass jus-
tice for a mass tort. 
The Fifth Circuit has yet to decide whether Judge Parker's 
scheme comports with the defendants' right to individualized adju-
dications of causation and damage. In the meantime, both the va-
lidity of the aggregative technique used in Cimino, as a matter of 
statistical principles, and its normative implications have received 
close attention in the secondary literature.70 In retrospect, how-
ever, one may best regard judicial aggregation of the type in Cimino 
as a provocative detour on the road to the kinds of privately negoti-
65. 751 F. Supp. at 651-52. 
66. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1990). 
67. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652. 
68. See 751 F. Supp. at 653. 
69. See 751 F. Supp. at 653. 
70. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561 {1993) (criticizing the nonnative implica-
tions of Cimino for positing an arbitrary allocation of the opportunity to have one's case tried 
in court); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Bene· 
fits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992) 
{defending Cimino on grounds of statistical accuracy). 
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ated settlements established more recently for breast implants and 
for the asbestos claims covered in Georgine. n 
The recent mass tort settlements demonstrate, in essence, that it 
is possible to achieve something superior to Judge Parker's aggrega-
tive solution without Judge Parker. Rather than depend upon some 
statistical sampling from random trials, members of the mass tort 
plaintiffs' bar and defense counsel may seek to hammer out mutu-
ally acceptable principles for compensation based upon experience 
in the relevant stock market for claims. The structure of such set-
tlement agreements, their potential pitfalls, and how courts should 
deal with them are the subject of what follows. 
C. Mass Tort Settlements 
Although the recent settlements for asbestos and breast im-
plants contain some variations, one may discern from those agree-
ments an emerging pattern for mass tort settlements.72 The three 
salient features of this pattern concern the impetus and structure of 
settlement negotiations, the nature of the compensation system es-
tablished thereby, and the use of opt-out class actions under Rule 
23(b )(3) as the procedural mechanism to give binding effect to the 
settlement agreement. In detailing these features, I speak to their 
institutional advantages for the treatment of mass torts as well as to 
the prospects for application of similar techniques in the future. 
1. Settlement Negotiations 
The genesis of mass tort settlements does not lie entirely with 
private attorneys; rather, consolidation by the MDL Panel has 
served as an important mechanism to focus the attention of counsel 
on both sides upon the possibility of a solution through private bar-
gaining. The negotiations that produced the Georgine asbestos set-
tlement, for instance, began in the aftermath of consolidation by the 
MDL Panel of all asbestos litigation pending throughout the federal 
courts.73 Indeed, in so doing, the MDL Panel held out the hope 
that its action would serve as "a great opportunity to all participants 
who sincerely wish to resolve these asbestos matters fairly and with 
71. The cases consolidated in Cimino were pending prior to the settlement in Georgine 
and, hence, remain unaffected thereby. See supra note 1. 
72. In addition to these two settlements, a third agreement concerns agricultural workers 
exposed to the pesticide Galecron. That agreement - though less widely known - also 
follows the pattern exhibited by its two, more famous cousins. See Stipulation of Settlement, 
Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 94-0647-CB-S (S.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 1994). 
73. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.ML. 1991) (selecting the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania as the forum for consolidated proceedings). 
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as little unnecessary expense as possible."74 Likewise, MDL con-
solidation of federal breast implant litigation with Judge Sam 
Pointer of the Northern District of Alabama led to a process of 
private negotiation, facilitated at points by the judge himself.75 
Although originally conceived solely to coordinate pretrial pro-
ceedings in related federal lawsuits,76 MDL consolidation of mass 
tort claims has served as the springboard for more sweeping meas-
ures. The idea has not been to coordinate preparations for individ-
ual trials but, instead, to alleviate the need for trial. The principal 
focus of the recent settlements - indeed, in the case of the 
Georgine asbestos agreement, the exclusive focus - has not been 
upon pending litigation but, more broadly, upon the creation of pri-
vate compensation regimes for future mass tort claims. In other 
words, although MDL consolidation brought the two sides to the 
bargaining table, such consolidation does not limit the reach of the 
resulting private negotiations. 
Apart from the genesis of negotiations, there has been some 
variation in the manner in which particular plaintiffs' counsel have 
come to serve as negotiators. Some class counsel may take on this 
role as a spinoff from some larger committee of plaintiffs' lawyers. 
Upon MDL consolidation of the asbestos litigation, for example, all 
of the involved counsel on the plaintiffs' side formed a steering 
committee to bargain with their counterparts for the defense.77 
These negotiations ultimately ran aground, however, due to dis-
putes within each camp over the acceptability of the other side's 
proposals.78 The settlement that ultimately resulted did not reach 
all defendants but, instead, only the twenty asbestos companies col-
lectively represented by the Center for Claims Resolution.79 More-
over, their negotiating partners consisted not of the steering 
committee as a whole but, instead, the two plaintiffs' law firms that 
had originally been selected by their peers as co-leads of the steer-
ing committee - namely, the Ness, Motley. firm and the 
Philadelphia firm of Greitzer & Locks.so 
74. 771 F. Supp. at 424. 
75. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 
1992); Henry Weinstein, When Law, Tragedy Intersect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1994, at Al, 
A28-29 (describing implant settlement negotiations and the role of Judge Pointer therein). 
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994) (noting that each of the actions so consolidated "shall 
be remanded by the (MDL Panel] at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to 
the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated"). 
77. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 265 (i 30) (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
78. See 157 F.R.D. at 266 (ii 32-35). 
79. See 157 F.R.D. at 266 (i 35). 
80. See 157 F.R.D. at 293-94 (ii 178-84). 
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Other class counsel may come to the negotiating table as a kind 
of judicially selected bargaining unit. In reaching the breast im-
plant settlement, for instance, counsel for the defendant manufac-
turers bargained with a steering committee selected by Judge 
Pointer, consisting of seventeen leading plaintiffs' lawyers involved 
in implant litigation.81 
The precise way in which particular counsel come to represent 
the plaintiff class for purposes of settlement negotiations remains a 
subject of controversy, which I address later.82 For present pur-
poses, the main point is that the substantive terms of the recent 
mass tort settlements are the handiwork of private attorneys, albeit 
brought together through the impetus of MDL consolidation. 
2. Compensation 
In terms of their substantive content, the recent mass tort settle-
ments seek, in effect, to replace mass tort litigation with a private 
administrative compensation scheme - a kind of miniature admin-
istrative agency, if you will. In the Georgine asbestos settlement, a 
nonprofit corporation established by the settling defendants will ad-
minister the compensation system, subject to oversight by class 
counsel and a major labor union.83 The settling parties in the breast 
implant settlement took a slightly different approach, providing for 
court appointment of an independent claims administrator.84 
Under either variation, however, the salient attributes of these sys-
tems consist of a compensation "grid," simplification of causation 
issues, and an insurance component. 
a. The Grid. Much like Judge Parker in Cimino, mass tort set-
tlements divide the claims of the plaintiff class into several distinct 
categories that correspond to the medical conditions thought to re-
sult from the product in question.8s Indeed, much of the settlement 
consists of technical language, like the regulations of public admin-
istrative agencies, describing the precise medical evidence that a 
81. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at A28. 
82. See infra section 111.B.2.b.ii {discussing Georgine negotiations as an illustration of a 
holdout problem). 
83. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 257 n.3, 267 («Jl 38), 304 (H 235, 240). 
84. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 10. 
85. For instance, the asbestos settlement establishes four such categories: mesothelioma, 
a particularly deadly form of cancer in the lining of the lung; lung cancer; other forms of 
cancer; and nonmalignant conditions, such as asbestosis and thickening of the pleural tissue 
within the lung, at least when impairment of lung functions results. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. 
at 269 («Jl 51). Similarly, the breast implant settlement established several categories for scle-
roderma or lupus, connective tissue diseases, and other autoimmune disorders, among sev-
eral conditions. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 6 (schedule of benefits). 
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claimant must present in order to demonstrate the existence of a 
specified condition.86 These medical criteria themselves may be the 
subject of considerable contention between the two sides. 
The creation of disease categories and medical criteria enables 
counsel then to focus upon negotiation of compensation amounts 
within each category. On this question, there is room for tradeoffs 
between specificity and discretion. The breast implant settlement 
subdivided each disease category by both severity and the age of 
the claimant and then set a fixed compensation amount for each 
box of the resulting "grid."87 The asbestos settlement, in contrast, 
simply sets a range of payments for each disease category. Claim-
ants who meet the relevant medical criteria can receive the mini-
mum amount with no further questions asked. Alternatively, 
claimants may request a more individualized evaluation of their 
medical condition and other considerations that bear upon the com-
pensation calculus within the agreed-upon range, including not only 
personal characteristics like age and earning capacity but also fac-
tors that affect the expected level of their recovery in tort, such as 
the forum in which the claimant likely would have sued but for the 
binding force of the settlement. 88 
The generation of a compensation grid is not without limita-
tions. In the absence of trials in a limited sampling of individual 
cases, as contemplated in Cimino, there must be some source of 
information on appropriate compensation levels for the various dis-
eases. In the asbestos example, such information came into exist-
ence after literally years of protracted litigation in the traditional 
tort system. Asbestos is, after all, the paradigmatic example of a 
mature mass tort89 and, by the time of the Georgine settlement ne-
gotiations, a well-developed stock market mechanism had emerged. 
86. See Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and Defendants Repre-
sented by the Center for Claims Resolution, Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 21-33; Lindsey (Sept. 1, 
1994), supra note 2, at exh. E. 
87. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 6 (schedule of benefits). The word "grid," by 
now, has become the common way in which commentators refer to such a compensation 
scheme. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 10, at 1614; Judith Resnik, Procedural Innovations, 
Sloshing Over: A Comment on Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: 
The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEXAS L. 
REv. 1627, 1633 (1995). 
88. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 276-77 (H 91-92). The settlement further provides for a 
special panel selected by settling counsel to review a limited number of "extraordinary" 
claims - those by persons who believe they warrant compensation beyond the range speci-
fied in the settlement See 157 F.R.D. at 276 (q[ 91). 
89. See McGovern, supra note 49, at 659. 
February 1996] Tort to Administration 923 
As a result, the settling parties could fashion their grid by reference 
to historical patterns of settlement.90 
The use of historical data on recoveries in tort partakes of a 
recent proposal by Glen Robinson and Kenneth Abraham, in which 
they envision the development of "claim profiles . . . constructed 
from data derived from prior adjudications and settlements in the 
same or similar cases."91 Again, the notion is that traditional tort 
litigation may be used to set a baseline for compensation, but that 
resolution of repetitious claims need not entail such elaborate pro-
cedures. The difference, however, is that Robinson and Abraham 
speak of the construction of claim profiles by courts, whereas the 
recent settlements suggest that the same technique may be used -
perhaps with greater efficiency - by private attorneys experienced 
in the relevant mass tort stock market. 
If repetition of the asbestos experience were the only way to 
reach a mass tort settlement, such devices would hold only limited 
attraction. The background to the breast implant settlement, how-
ever, suggests that such is not the case. There, only six individual 
cases had been litigated to verdicts in the tort system at the time of 
settlement negotiations.92 In preparation for the negotiations, how-
ever, the plaintiffs' bar had invested several million dollars toward 
the collection and organization of documents bearing upon the de-
fendant manufacturers' knowledge of potential product risks.93 
Their efforts paralleled the Food and Drug Administration's con-
temporaneous investigation into similar issues in connection with its 
moratorium on new implant sales.94 
The point is that it does not necessarily take years of protracted 
tort litigation to afford an informational baseline for negotiation. 
Where experience in the tort system is limited, however, substantial 
uncertainty may remain on particular elements of the plaintiffs' 
claims. This expands the compensation range over which counsel 
must bargain and makes the fashioning of a negotiated compromise 
more difficult. 
Moreover, regardless of how the compensation grid is created, 
its credibility will depend upon the availability of sufficient funds 
90. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 277 (CJ[ 95). 
91. Robinson & Abraham, supra note 16, at 1491. 
92. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *2; Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 
992. 
93. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at A26; see also Aaron M. Levine, What Our Committee 
Accomplished, WASH. PoST, May 20, 1994, at A24 {letter to the editor). 
94. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 994. 
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for all who remain in the plaintiff class actually to receive the pay-
ments set forth. As discussed in greater detail below,9s this issue 
will turn upon the accuracy of settling counsel's projections as to 
the number of claims under the settlement - another subject upon 
which historical experience in the tort system can be an invaluable 
guide. Indeed, inaccuracy in this regard is precisely what led to the 
collapse of the breast implant settlement in its original form. 
b. Causation. Simplification of causation issues also adds to 
the streamlining of the compensation system. A claimant need only 
show exposure to a product of one of the settling defendants plus 
the existence of a disease that meets the specified medical criteria. 
Any remaining uncertainty over general causation is simply fac-
tored into the compensation calculus, and evidence of specific cau-
sation - proof of a link between the particular claimant's exposure 
and her medical condition - typically is not required.96 That de-
fendants in the asbestos settlement should have agreed, in effect, to 
concede the existence of causation hardly seems surprising. The 
existence of a link between asbestos and a host of diseases is, by 
now, virtually indisputable as a general matter,97 so defendants give 
up little in the streamlining of causation issues. The same conces-
sion can be highly significant, however, for products like breast im-
plants, for which general causation - the issue of whether the 
product causes autoimmune disorders in anyone - remains ques-
tionable, at best.98 
95. See infra section III.B.2.a. 
96. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 268 ('ll 46) (E.D. Pa. 1994); Lindsey 
(Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *5. 
97. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued, 
No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995) ("In the real world, the scientific community long ago 
resolved the issues that continue to be litigated by the courts. Every institution •.• that has 
investigated this remarkable natural mineral has concluded that it is inherently dangerous."). 
98. See Gina Kolata, Proof of a Breast Implant Peril is Lacking, Rheumatologists Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1995, at B7 (noting that the American College of Rheumatology has 
concluded that "silicone implants expose patients to no demonstrable additional risk for con-
nective tissue or rheumatic disease"). As one reporter has noted: 
The most definitive study yet of the health effects of silicone breast implants has failed to 
find any association between the implants and connective tissue diseases. The new study 
is so compelling and its results so consistent with previous studies that some leading 
rheumatologists contend that the issue of whether implants cause these diseases can now 
be considered closed. 
Gina Kolata, New Study Finds No Link Between Implants and Illness, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
1995, at A18; see Kolata, supra note 46, at DS (noting "the new and growing body of evidence 
from seven epidemiological studies, some commissioned by implant makers and some by the 
Federal Government, which have consistently failed to find links between implants and 
autoimmune diseases"); Gina Kolata, Legal System and Science Come to Differing Conclu-
sions on Silicone, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at C6 (same); see also Marcia Angell, Are Breast 
Implants Actually OK?, NEW REPUBuc, Sept. 11, 1995, at 18, 20 (same). But see Feldman, 
February 1996] Tort to Administration 925 
The observation that the breast implant agreement reached a 
resolution of the causation issue similar to that of the asbestos 
agreement belies the complaint raised by John Coffee that mass tort 
settlements will tend to come too early in the development cycle of 
mass torts, such that the plaintiff class will receive far less than they 
might otherwise obtain from a settlement at some later point.99 
Time is not always on the plaintiffs' side. For breast implants, the 
epidemiological studies completed thus far merely have added to 
skepticism over a causal link to autoimmune disorders. 
This pattern is by no means unique. In the Agent Orange class 
action litigation, defendants agreed to establish a compensation 
program for exposed Vietnam veterans, but, when it came time to 
adjudicate the individual claims of those veterans who had opted 
out of the plaintiff class, the court ultimately rejected their causa-
tion case as inadequately grounded in science.100 Likewise, massive 
epidemiological data ultimately belied the early success of plaintiffs 
in litigation over birth defects allegedly caused by the antinausea 
drug Bendectin.101 If anything, these examples support the image 
of mass tort settlements as vehicles for genuine compromise by 
both plaintiffs and defendants in the face of scientific uncertainty, 
with plaintiffs sacrificing their chance at more money in the event of 
new causation evidence and defendants surrendering the prospect 
of stonewalling until such time, if ever, r, that the scientific evidence 
comes to rest squarely on their side. 
The potential efficiency gains from such compromises are well-
discussed in the mass tort literature. Specifically, the simplification 
of causation and the development of a compensation grid together 
carry the promise of substantial reductions in the transaction costs 
associated with the transfer of money from defendants to plain-
supra note 27, at 25 (questioning the reliability of epidemiological studies thus far completed 
regarding implants). 
One possible explanation for the willingness of implant manufacturers to enter into a 
settlement, notwithstanding the shakiness of the plaintiffs' case on general causation, may lie 
in fears that common law juries might be swayed unduly by evidence suggesting that manu-
facturers operated with a cavalier attitude toward potential health risks - even if such risks 
ultimately did not come to pass. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 993-96 (summa-
rizing the results of FDA investigations suggesting that manufacturers may have engaged in 
inadequate testing of implants and may have withheld test results that called into question 
product safety). 
99. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1360. 
100. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Llab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 
affd., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
101. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the 
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1993). 
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tiffs.102 In the asbestos litigation, for example, only thirty-seven to 
thirty-nine percent of the money expended by defendants actually 
goes toward compensation of plaintiffs, with the rest being con-
sumed in the transfer process.103 Empirical research in the future 
fruitfully might examine whether the recent settlements ultimately 
live up to their promise to reduce such deadweight loss. 
c. Insurance. Finally, mass tort settlements characteristically 
contain an insurance component designed to overcome the tempo-
ral dispersion of mass tort claims. Specifically, the recent settle-
ments provide minimal or no immediate cash compensation for 
those who have yet to become impaired, but they do afford such 
persons the opportunity to obtain compensation if impairment ulti-
mately does result. Most notably, this principle applies to claimants 
who initially obtain compensation for a nonmalignant condition but 
who later develop cancer.104 
In essence, the settlements provide an insurance policy funded 
by defendants. They address the phenomenon of temporal disper-
sion not by struggling to fit all exposed persons into the mold of 
traditional tort litigation for immediate injuries but rather by mov-
ing outside of that framework to accommodate the flow of claims 
over time. The effect is to focus the private compensation scheme 
upon those most in need of immediate help.105 
3. Binding Effect 
The use of streamlined compensation techniques is by no means 
unprecedented. Workers' compensation laws have existed for 
nearly a century to move entire categories of recurring claims from 
the tort litigation system into public administrative regimes.106 
Mass accident cases like the Kansas City Skywalk litigation have 
made use of plans to provide quick compensation payments to 
102. See Edley & Weiler, supra note 52, at 393. 
103. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 263 ('ll 18) (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
104. See 157 F.R.D. at 284 (IJI 129); Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *5-*6. The 
breast implant settlement, however, does provide for payment of medical costs incurred by 
those who choose to have their implants removed, even if they have yet to suffer any ill 
effects. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 4-5 (discussing the "explantation" fund). 
105. This attribute of the Georgine settlement builds upon earlier efforts to develop so-
called pleural registries, whereby asbestos plaintiffs diagnosed with observable changes in the 
condition of their lungs but who had yet to suffer impairment of their lung functions could 
register with the court and thereby toll the applicable statute of limitations. See Peter 
Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POLY. 541 (1992). 
106. See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE LAw AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURY, DISEASE, AND 
DEATii 8 (1990) (discussing early workers' compensation legislation). 
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plaintiffs upon the presentation of minimal supporting evidence.101 
In the mass tort area, plans for the distribution of compensation to 
mass tort plaintiffs from bankrupt tortfeasors such as Johns-
Manville and A.H. Robins, the maker of the Dalkon Shield, have 
used compensation "grids."108 Moreover, the story of Judge 
Weinstein's successful effort to bring to a conclusion protracted 
class action litigation over Agent Orange by way of a settlement on 
the eve of trial is a mainstay of the mass tort literature.109 
The recent mass tort settlements nonetheless depart signifi-
cantly from these earlier models. As in the case of Agent Orange, 
the recent settlements have come as part of class actions under 
Rule 23(b )(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - the so-
called opt-out form of class action predicated upon the existence of 
legal or factual issues common to the class as a whole.110 This form 
of class action is unique among those recognized under Rule 23 in 
that class members have the right to exclude themselves from the 
action and, thereby, any resulting settlement.111 
The definition of the plaintiff class under Rule 23(b )(3) may in-
clude both current and future claimants or only the latter. In the 
breast implant settlement, the plaintiff class encompassed all per-
sons, including those with pending tort actions, who received their 
implants prior to June 1993.112 In contrast, the plaintiff class in the 
Georgine asbestos settlement consists of workers exposed on the 
job to asbestos products from any of the twenty settling defendants 
but who had not sued in the tort system as of the date the settle-
ment was filed.113 As I discuss later, this second approach to class 
107. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 973. 
108. See supra note 87; see also Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative 
Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBS., Autumn 1990, at 113. 
109. See SawCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 16. 
110. See supra note 5. For a discussion of the determination to certify a mass tort settle-
ment class, see infra section 111.C.2.a. 
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). The prospect of bankruptcy amongst the settling de-
fendants - and its occurrence after a settlement has been reached, as in the case of Dow 
Coming - can be a formidable obstacle to the operation of a mass tort settlement. Mass 
tort settlements nonetheless do not entail the use of subsection (b )(l)(B) of Rule 23 for class 
actions against a limited fund. I accordingly discuss the future prospects for such agreements 
upon the assumption that the settling defendants do not avail themselves of the limited fund 
concept. For a stimulating discussion of mass torts in the bankruptcy context, see Thomas A. 
Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE LJ. 367 (1994). 
112. See Lindsey (Sept. l, 1994), supra note 2, at *79. 
113. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257-58 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The 
courts have clarified that exposure to a harmful substance constitutes injury in fact sufficient 
to afford standing in federal court to future claimants who have been exposed but remain 
presently unimpaired. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1454 
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (class of future claimants in Georgine.asbestos settlement); see also In re 
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1434 (2d Cir. 1993) (veterans exposed to 
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definition raises special concerns where cases already pending in 
the tort system - so-called inventory cases - receive different 
compensation terms.114 
Unlike the Agent Orange example, however, the recent settle-
ments do not represent the denouement to class action litigation in 
the conventional sense. Instead, they use the class action simply to 
give binding effect to a settlement reached prior to judicial certifica-
tion of a plaintiff class under Rule 23. Indeed, the settling parties in 
Georgine filed their agreement with the court simultaneously with 
the plaintiffs' class action complaint.11s 
By embodying the settlement agreement in the form of a judg-
ment rendered in a class action, counsel seek to afford predictability 
to defendants. If valid, the judgment will obligate the members of 
the plaintiff class - at least those who do not affirmatively opt out 
- to pursue their demands for compensation through the settle-
ment regime rather than through individual lawsuits in tort.116 The 
Georgine asbestos settlement has an initial lifespan of ten years, 
Agent Orange); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 835-36 (Bankr. E. & 
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (persons exposed to asbestos products of Johns-Manville), vacated on other 
grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on rehg., 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). Numerous 
other courts have reached the merits of cases involving exposed-but-unimpaired persons, 
without raising any doubt as to standing requirements. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. 
Ct. 2475 (1993) (prisoners exposed to second-hand smoke have cause of action for constitu-
tional tort); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (PCBs); In re A.H. 
Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.) (Dalkon Shield), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); 
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (heart valve), appeal dismissed with-
out opinion, 995 F2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993); In re Fernald Litig., No. C-1-85-149, 1989 U.S. 
Dist LEXIS 17764 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 1992) (radiation from uranium processing plant). 
114. See infra section III.B2.b.ii. 
115. See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 257. For jurisdictional purposes, the analogue would be 
a consent decree, in which a public administrative agency presents for judicial approval a 
prenegotiated settlement reached with a regulated entity in order to provide prospective re-
lief. See Carlough, 834 F. Supp. at 1463-64 (citing authorities). That such a lawsuit consti-
tutes a "case or controversy" sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction under Article III 
has long been settled. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1928); 
SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1984). 
116. The legitimacy of this application of the class action device remains controversial. 
As I discuss infra, debate has centered upon whether courts may certify a class under Rule 23 
for purposes of settlement when that procedural device would be unwieldy for purposes of 
actual litigation. Likewise, uncertainty remains over the basis for personal jurisdiction over 
class members. See infra section III.C.2, Part IV (suggesting that Congress may bolster the 
legitimacy of mass tort settlements by replacing the class action as their binding mechanism 
with a statutory regime that would give effect to such agreements in a manner similar to 
negotiated rulemaking by public administrative agencies). 
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with future negotiations to cover subsequent periods;117 the breast 
implant settlement would have had a thirty-year lifespan.118 
Apart from repose for defendants, the use of the class action 
mechanism to bind future claimants has implications for both public 
awareness and procedural issues. As for the former, the recent set-
tlements have drawn far more attention to their respective subjects 
- particularly among members of the general public outside of the 
legal profession - than otherwise would have occurred through 
protracted litigation in the tort system. To meet the requirement of 
Rule 23(c)(2) that class members receive "the best notice practica-
ble under the circumstances" in order for them to exercise their 
opt-out rights, the recent mass tort settlements have involved mas-
sive efforts to reach exposed persons through individualized mail-
ings, intermediaries such as unions and doctors, and at-large 
advertisements in the mass media.119 Indeed, the sheer scope of the 
breast implant settlement made it front-page news in the general-
interest press.120 In short, an opt-out class action may well be more 
successful than the traditional tort system in placing the story of the 
plaintiff class before the public and focusing attention upon possible 
tortious conduct. 
As for procedural issues, the recent settlements represent a pri-
vate contractual solution to what otherwise would be unwieldy 
problems of judicial consolidation. For instance, settlement 
through the medium of Rule 23(b )(3) may bundle together claims 
that otherwise would be resistant to consolidation due to the juris-
dictional limitations applicable to individual lawsuits. In a class ac-
tion, there need only be complete diversity between the 
representative plaintiffs and all defendants; complete diversity over 
the entire plaintiff class is unnecessary.121 The upshot is that future 
claims in state courts that otherwise would escape MDL consolida-
tion now can be reached. This, in essence, is the response of the 
recent settlements to the geographic dispersion of mass tort claims. 
117. Counsel will renegotiate the compensation grid after the initial 10-year period of the 
settlement. Adjustments at that time may be no greater than 20%, and the settlement pro-
vides for dispute resolution procedures in the event that negotiations reach an impasse. See 
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 277 ('ll 93). 
118. See Lindsey (Sept 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *5. 
119. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314, 320-23 (E.D. Pa. 1993); 
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 312 ('ll 290); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. 
(Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp.), No. CV92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 114580, at *8-*11 (N.D. 
Ala. Apr. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Lindsey (Apr. 1, 1994)]. 
120. See, e.g., Kolata, Landmark Accord, supra note 8, at Al; Henry Weinstein & David 
Olmos, $3.75-Billion Settlement of Implant Suits is OKd, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at Al. 
121. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969). 
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It would be a mistake, however, to regard the surmounting of 
jurisdictional limitations as a wholly desirable achievement. Those 
constraints exist for a purpose, after all - not the least of which is 
to command respect for the substantive rights embodied in the 
common law of tort in the various states.122 The prospect of class 
members trading away those rights at the instigation of class coun-
sel who may have their own entrepreneurial interests at heart and 
who act outside conventional channels of client control does not 
exactly leave one with a warm feeling of security. It is awfully hard, 
after all, to control an attorney you do not know, who is negotiating 
a settlement on your behalf in a class action that may not yet have 
appeared on the public docket. These concerns have led to explo-
ration of the possibility that judicial review within the framework of 
Rule 23 might serve as a surrogate for client control, and it is to that 
enterprise that I next tum. 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AGENCY COSTS 
A. The Framework of Rule 23 
The use of Rule 23 as the means to bind the plaintiff class to the 
settlement carries with it a requirement of judicial review. Subsec-
tion (e) of Rule 23 specifically provides that "[a] class action shall 
not be ... compromised without the approval of the court. "123 To 
give content to this requirement, the courts have asked whether a 
class action settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate"124 and 
have made use of hearings to receive evidence and argument on 
whether this substantive standard has been met.125 
The basic rationale for this judicial inquiry is straightforward: in 
traditional litigation amongst private parties, the adequacy of a set-
tlement can safely be left for the parties themselves to assess, with 
each knowing what is best for itself and each possessing the ability 
to impress its preferences upon counsel. In this regard, the ade-
quacy of a settlement in private litigation is akin to other questions, 
such as the adequacy of consideration to support a contract, that 
122. See infra section III.C.2.a (discussing choice of law problems). 
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
124. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.) (securities class 
action), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); accord, e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 900 
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1138 (1986); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 
(11th Cir. 1984); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 179 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, 
NEWBERG ON Cr.Ass ACTIONS § 11.41, at 11-91 (3d ed. 1992). 
125. See 2 NEWBERG & CoNTE, supra note 124, § 11.56. 
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the law leaves largely in private hands.126 The problem in the class 
action context is that "the negotiator on the plaintiffs' side, that is, 
the lawyer for the class, is potentially an unreliable agent of his 
principals."127 This is, in other words, a classic illustration of an 
agency cost problem - namely, a situation in which reliance upon 
an agent for the exercise of discretion in accordance with some spe-
cialized expertise comes only at the cost that the agent, in practice, 
may exercise discretion in a manner at odds with his principals' 
interests. 
Where a settlement concludes active litigation in a class action 
format, this traditional justification for judicial review has consider-
able force, given the sequence in which class certification and settle-
ment occur. Class certification takes place at the early stages of 
litigation; in fact, Rule 23(c)(l) calls for the court to determine 
whether class certification is warranted "[a]s soon as practicable af-
ter the commencement of [the] action."128 Absent the rare step of 
class decertification at some later stage, the members of a plaintiff 
class will become locked into representation by class counsel. By 
the time that a settlement comes to fruition, the period within 
which to opt out will have long passed, and the court accordingly 
must make certain that counsel have not sold out the interests of 
the class in the settlement agreement. 
Where settlement occurs prior to judicial certification of an opt-
out class, however, the justification for judicial review is less obvi-
ous. Where the members of the plaintiff class have the chance to 
consider the settlement terms at the same time that they must de-
cide whether to opt out, there initially might seem little justification 
for an additional layer of judicial scrutiny under Rule 23( e ). 
Although there may not have been client control at the time of the 
settlement negotiations, there is a degree of control ex post, 
through assertion of the right to opt out by the members of the 
plaintiff class. 
In no instance, however, has a court intimated that the forma-
tion of a settlement prior to certification of an opt-out class some-
how will suspend the requirement of Rule 23( e) for judicial review 
of the settlement terms. That would be difficult to do, given the 
126. See Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Natl. Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 
1987) (Posner, J.). 
127. 834 F.2d at 681; see also, e.g., In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 801-03 (3d Cir. 1995); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, 
supra note 10, at 680. 
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l). 
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absence of any distinction along such lines in the text of Rule 23( e ). 
In addition to positive law, moreover, there are sound policy rea-
sons that support judicial review of prenegotiated class action set-
tlements, especially in the mass tort area. 
The persistence of judicial review under Rule 23( e) stands as a 
tacit recognition that the opt-out mechanism is an imperfect check 
upon class counsel. Particularly in the mass tort context, some class 
members may not learn of the opportunity to opt out, notwith-
standing provision of the "best notice practicable" pursuant to a 
multimedia campaign under Rule 23(c)(2). In other words, mass 
torts are unlike, say, securities class actions where there typically 
are records of who bought what and when; rather, in the absence of 
data on exactly who was exposed to the product in question, there 
are bound to be at least some members of the plaintiff class who 
will remain unknown to class counsel. Depending upon the nature 
of the product in question, still others may not themselves be aware 
that they are within the class of exposed persons. Simply as a prac-
tical matter, then, not all members of the plaintiff class may be able 
to engage in ex post ratification of class counsel's handiwork. 
More fundamentally, a mass tort settlement effected through 
the vehicle of a class action forces the members of the plaintiff class 
to choose between the tort system and a private compensation re-
gime. Apart from the representative plaintiffs named in the class 
complaint, however, few class members will have agreed to be put 
to such a choice. The vast majority of class members do not author-
ize the negotiations by class counsel in their name; indeed, they 
may well be unaware that such negotiations are taking place. 
Moreover, by definition, prenegotiated settlements come into being 
prior to any judicial determination under Rule 23 that a class action 
is even an appropriate procedural vehicle or that those who hold 
themselves out as class counsel should be entitled to do so.129 In 
this light, one may understand judicial review for fairness under 
Rule 23( e) as a means - albeit after the fact - to pass upon the 
process by which counsel have put the class of exposed persons to a 
choice between tort and administration. 
Such review may be particularly valuable given the dynamics 
that can arise from the creation of a settlement. As Judge Posner 
has observed, "where notice of the class action is ... sent simultane-
ously with the notice of the settlement itself, the class members are 
129. See GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 7frl. 
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presented with what looks like a fait accompli."130 The very exist-
ence of a multimillion-dollar settlement, in other words, may give 
rise to its own momentum, which individual class members may feel 
they cannot resist effectively. Again, judicial review over the settle-
ment as a whole may act as a supplement for the imperfections of 
ex post review by class members on a person-by-person basis. 
B. Agency Costs in Mass Tort Settlements 
If courts are to be on the lookout for agency costs in mass tort 
settlements, it would be helpful to have a more specific idea of the 
reasons why class counsel might accept unfair settlement terms. 
The problem of agency costs in the class action context stems from 
defendants' indifference between payments to the plaintiff class and 
payments to class counsel. When negotiating a settlement in a class 
action, counsel for the plaintiff class are in a position to entice de-
fendants to reduce their total payments by providing counsel with 
generous fees but affording inadequate compensation to the class. 
A controversial recent example in consumer class action litigation is 
the phenomenon of so-called scrip settlements, whereby members 
of the plaintiff class receive certificates usable only for discounts 
toward the purchase of new products from the defendants, but class 
counsel receive substantial fees in cash.131 
Such scrip settlements clearly would lie beyond the pale in the 
mass tort context, but the problem of agency costs may persist in 
more subtle forms. As noted earlier, a distinctive feature of mass 
tort settlements is an insurance component designed to respond to 
the temporal dispersion of claims by providing compensation to 
plaintiffs over many years in the future, as their impairments come 
to light. This feature of class action settlements in the mass tort 
context - arising from the peculiar nature of mass torts themselves 
- provides additional prospects for class counsel to earn fees be-
yond those available in ordinary class action litigation over injuries 
confined to the past. 
130. Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680-81; see also GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 789. 
131. Compare, e.g., GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 768 (overturning district court's ap-
proval of class action settlement of breach of warranty claims in which purchasers of GMC 
trucks with gas tanks alleged to be susceptible to leakage upon side impact collision would 
have received certificates usable only toward purchases of new GMC trucks but class counsel 
would have received $9.5 million in fees) with In re Domestic AirTransp. Antitrust Litig., 148 
F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (approving settlement of class action against major airlines for 
price fixing in which consumers in the plaintiff class received discount coupons for future 
flights but class counsel received over $14 million in fees). See Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Cou-
pons, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at Cl (describing controversy surrounding scrip 
settlements). 
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For class counsel, at least two fee sources exist: fees from the 
class action that results in creation of the settlement itself and con-
tingent fees for the representation of compensation claims under 
the settlement.132 The appropriate relationship between these two 
sorts of fees has yet to receive attention from the courts. What can 
be said at this early juncture is that the rationale behind a fee award 
for class counsel simply for the creation of a mass tort settlement is 
an unwieldy holdover from more traditional uses of the class action 
device in other areas of litigation. Where the claims of the plaintiff 
class are not temporally dispersed, the compensation described in 
the settlement can be paid immediately - to the victims of a price-
fixing ring, to those who purchased a security based upon a mislead-
ing prospectus, and to the like. There is no need for further stages 
of legal representation. Instead, the court can award fees to class 
counsel based upon the total pot of damages obtained for the plain-
tiffs under the theory that counsel have produced a "common pool" 
of benefits for the class as a whole, upon calculation of a reasonable 
hourly rate for counsel's time under the so-called lodestar method 
or some combination thereof.133 
The recent mass tort settlements contemplate a fee award to 
counsel for the plaintiff class.134 The asbestos settlement leaves the 
issue in the lap of the court by providing merely that the settling 
defendants agree to pay such fee award to class counsel as the court 
shall determine.135 The breast implant settlement was only slightly 
more precise: it provided for a judicial determination of fees for 
plaintiff class counsel but made such fees payable from funds placed 
in a particular account, the size of which was specified in the 
settlement.136 
After receiving a fee award for the creation of the settlement, 
however, class counsel have the opportunity to obtain a second se-
ries of fees based upon the filing of individual compensation claims 
at later times. Indeed, that is the whole point of the insurance com-
ponent. Should class counsel wish to remain involved in the subject 
area the settlement covers, they will have a major opportunity to 
reduce their labor costs under a private administrative compensa-
132. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1375. 
133. On the calculation of class counsel fees in traditional class action litigation, see 
Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 10, at 22-23. 
134. Defense counsel, of course, do not depend upon an award in order to obtain fees, as 
they are compensated by their corporate clients on the basis of hourly rates. 
135. See Georgine v. Arnchern Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 285 ('ll 136) (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
136. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 9-10. 
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tion scheme. Specifically, counsel no longer need employ associates 
to represent clients in depositions, conduct settlement negotiations, 
appear in court, and undertake other tasks that only attorneys may 
perform.137 Instead, they may switch to lower-priced paralegals to 
assemble the paperwork necessary to present an administrative 
claim for compensation. In this regard, the settlement simply would 
accentuate trends already observed in high-volume plaintiffs' law 
firms involved in mass tort litigation.138 The settlement presents 
class counsel with the opportunity to become a Wal-Mart for legal 
services. 
The success of such a cost-cutting effort remains somewhat con-
strained, however, to the extent that the settlement - like the re-
cent ones - would permit compensation claims to be filed on a pro 
se basis.139 This, however, is unlikely to make a huge dent in the 
market for counsel's services. Although empirical evidence is lim-
ited, the experience under the private compensation scheme estab-
lished in bankruptcy for Dalkon Shield victims suggests that 
claimants will continue to make substantial use of lawyers, even for 
the filing of administrative compensation claims.140 These results 
come as no surprise, given that - for the mass tort plaintiffs' bar -
it is typically the lawyer who searches for the client rather than vice 
versa.141 
A second constraint consists of limitations upon the contingent 
fees that class counsel may extract from represented claimants. The 
notion here is to adjust for the reduction in the risk to plaintiffs' 
counsel that flows from the existence of the settlement. The 
Georgine agreement, for example, caps at twenty-five percent the 
contingent fees that may be taken from compensation claims - a 
reduction from the thirty-three to forty percent typical for asbestos 
plaintiffs in the tort litigation system.142 The breast implant settle-
ment would have provided for judicial scrutiny of contingent fees 
137. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CoNDucr 466 (1992) (stating that unauthorized practice may include activities that require 
knowledge of the law above that of the average lay person, that involve the giving of advice 
concerning legal rights, or that customarily are performed by lawyers); CHARI.Es W. 
WOLFMAN, MODERN LEGAL Ennes § 15.1.3, at 835-36 (1986) (same). 
138. See Dillon, supra note 42, at 42. 
139. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 285 (~ 136); Breast Implant Litigation Settlement 
Agreement Questions and ~nswers at *24, Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2 . 
140. See Georgine M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (Or 
Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 654-55 & nn.135-36 (1992). 
141. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
142. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 285 (n 136-37). 
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for compensation claims and would have taken such fees from the 
same separate account as the fees for service as class counsel,143 
Finally, the success of a Wal-Mart strategy remains limited by 
the prospect that attorneys other than class counsel will seek to 
compete for clients in the aftermarket for compensation claims 
under the settlement. Class counsel, however, will have a strong 
basis upon which to promote themselves as the attorneys with the 
most extensive knowledge about the workings of the compensation 
regime. Indeed, to the extent that class counsel serve as monitors 
for the administration of the settlement, they could become privy to 
information about that system that may not be readily available to 
other lawyers.144 
One might regard the prospect of any attorney obtaining contin-
gent fees in the presence of very little contingency as unsavory at 
best.145 The prospect of such fees in the aftermarket for compensa-
tion claims, however, does have the salutary effect of aligning the 
entrepreneurial interests of class counsel with the interests of the 
plaintiff class in maximizing its return under the settlement. The 
more compensation there is, the greater the contingent fees for 
counsel who represent claimants in the aftermarket. 
The existence of two distinct sources of fees has the potential to 
play into the economic structure of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar in 
more disturbing ways. Although class counsel might want to re-
main in the subject area of the settlement, lowering their labor costs 
in the manner described, an award of fees simply for service as class 
counsel raises another tantalizing opportunity. Specifically, counsel 
may wish to cut and run - to leave the subject area entirely or, at 
least, in significant part. In particular, given the substantial costs 
that must be incurred to develop generic assets for budding areas of 
mass tort litigation, class counsel simply may want to take the fees 
generated from the formation of a settlement in one area and "rein-
vest" them in some other field of prospective mass tort litigation 
where expected returns might be greater over the long run. That 
143. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 9-10. 
144. In approving the Georgine asbestos settlement, for example, the district court ex-
pressed concern that class counsel might acquire "inside information" in the course of "fulfil-
ling their monitoring and supervisory duties." Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 304 (1 237). The 
court accordingly held out the possibility that it might, in the future, "exercise its power to 
appoint additional class counsel who can fulfill the vital monitoring and supervisory responsi· 
bilities •.. and who would not represent individual class members who submit claims for 
compensation." 157 F.R.D. at 304 ('l! 238). 
145. On the prevalence of contingent fees in situations where the risk to counsel is mini· 
mal, see Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince 
of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29 (1989). 
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the fee award for service as class counsel comes in a lump sum and 
comes much sooner than the dribble of contingent fees for individ-
ual compensation claims over time simply adds to the attraction. 
Indeed, this risk is especially pronounced when the settlement cov-
ers an area of mature litigation, such as asbestos. Having won one 
fight, a pioneering firm might wish to position itself to achieve pre-
eminence in yet another area of mass tort litigation. 
That counsel for the plaintiff classes in the asbestos and breast 
implant settlements should be at the forefront of other, newly de-
veloping areas of mass tort litigation is consistent with this hypothe-
sis. For example, fresh from the Georgine settlement, Ronald 
Motley has joined with other plaintiffs' lawyers who have agreed to 
contribute toward an annual budget of some six million dollars to 
fund class action litigation against the tobacco industry on behalf of 
nicotine-addicted persons.146 Another prominent participant in this 
consortium of "investors" - Stanley Chesley of Waite, Schneider, 
Bayless & Chesley in Cincinnati - served on the plaintiffs' steering 
committee that negotiated the breast implant settlement.147 Still 
other members of the steering committee, such as Elizabeth 
Cabraser of Lieff, Cabraser & Heimann in San Francisco, have ap-
peared on bar programs to explore the prospects for litigation 
against the makers of Norplant.148 
This is not to say that fees for settlement creation are unwar-
ranted. Where a mass tort settlement provides a more efficient and 
secure mechanism to get money into the hands of impaired persons, 
those who fashion that mechanism confer real benefit upon the 
plaintiff class over and above the compensation dollars that class 
members ultimately will receive. The prospect of a fee award for 
service as class counsel exacerbates the problem of agency costs, 
however, by reducing the correlation between class counsel's en-
trepreneurial interests and the interests of the plaintiff class in se-
curing fair compensation. The possibility that class counsel might 
use their fees for cross-fertilization of mass tort litigation does not 
necessarily mean that the plaintiff class will suffer. It does, how-
ever, underscore the need for some external monitor to guard 
against that possibility. 
One response to the foregoing problem might take the form of 
new substantive principles for fee awards. Specifically, courts could 
146. See Collins, supra note 39, at Dl, D3. 
147. See id. at Dl; Lindsey, (Apr. 1, 1994), supra note 119, at *3. 
148. See Kolata, supra note 9, at 5. The connection here is that the delivery device used 
in the Norplant contraceptive contains silicone. 
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explore ways to bring the determination of class counsel's fees into 
greater alignment with the distinctive nature of compensation 
under a mass tort settlement. To the extent that a settlement 
spreads payments to class members over an extended time period 
as their impairments arise, so might the fees for service as class 
counsel be deferred over time. Not only would this undercut the 
phenomenon of an immediate lump sum award that encourages re-
investment elsewhere, it also would tie the financial fate of class 
counsel to the workability of the settlement. In awarding fees to 
class counsel over time, a court might appropriately take into ac-
count whether the settlement has turned out to be a bad deal for 
the plaintiff class. 
Such an approach would carry risks of its own. Specifically, it 
may leave the plaintiffs' bar with insufficient incentives to under-
take the time-consuming negotiations necessary to fashion a large-
scale settlement. The law, however, need not rely exclusively upon 
controls that require ongoing judicial supervision of fees. The cal-
culation of fees is, after all, merely a proxy for that which the court 
is ultimately concerned with under Rule 23(e) - namely, the sub-
stantive fairness of the settlement terms for members of the plain-
tiff class. In addition to innovative thinking on fee awards, a 
complementary system of procedural controls might organize the 
way in which the courts review the fairness of mass tort settlement 
terms in order to detect the shortchanging of the plaintiff class. The 
workings of such a regime and its relationship to developments ear-
lier in this century are the subject to which I now turn. 
III. AN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON FAIRNESS 
The recent mass tort settlements hold the promise of a more 
systematized approach to compensation - one that may overcome 
the barriers in traditional litigation to consolidated disposition of 
claims in large numbers over time. Yet this promise remains depen-
dant upon an elite group of private attorneys who possess formida-
ble expertise in the subject area and who operate far removed from 
the usual channels of client control. Although the recent settle-
ments represent a bold departure in the area of mass torts, the story 
of their rise has a curiously familiar ring. This is not the first time in 
which innovative new legal institutions have evolved to address 
problems that exceeded the capacities of the common law, only to 
give rise to new concerns over control. The emergence of private 
attorneys as the principal architects of mass tort settlements paral-
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lels, in several salient respects, the rise of public administrative 
agencies earlier in this century. 
One might say that the Motleys, Chesleys, and Cabrasers of to-
day are, in this sense, the heirs of yesteryear's James Landis, Alfred 
Kahn, and Louis Brandeis - the "prophets of regulation" who 
oversaw the birth of modern administrative government.149 To be 
sure, the former have accumulated power through the innovative -
some might say diabolical - use of the class action device, whereas 
the latter received delegations of power from politically accounta-
ble institutions. This distinction is a significant one and forms the 
focus of later discussion.15° For present purposes, I simply draw at-
tention to the similarities in the circumstances that led to private 
compensation schemes for mass torts and those that underlie their 
counterparts in public regulation. 
The precise origins of the administrative state remain a subject 
of considerable debate among historians, and I do not purport to 
settle the: score here. Indeed, one may accept a prescription for 
judicial review of mass tort settlements along the lines of adminis-
trative law on purely pragmatic grounds - as the most coherent 
judicial safeguard against unfair settlement terms - without believ-
ing that the two phenomena share comparable- historical roots. 
That several striking similarities exist, however, seems beyond 
dispute. 
In the early years of this century, the rise of large corporate 
structures operating on a national scale was as dauntingly new as 
the phenomenon of mass torts to the present day. As historian 
Stephen Skowronek has put it: "Industrialism, in all its dimensions, 
exposed severe limitations in the mode of governmental operations 
that had evolved over the nineteenth century . . . . Providing the 
national institutional capacities commensurate with the demands of 
an industrial society required nothing less than building a different 
kind of [governmental] organization."151 Indeed, the familiar eco-
nomic justifications for regulation of industrial activity - control of 
monopoly power, cost internalization to account for externalities, 
and the like - flow from this singular historical development.152 
149. See THOMAS K. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984) (profiling these and 
other pioneers in public administrative regulation). 
150. See infra section III.C.2. 
151. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920, at 13 (1982). 
152. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982). 
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Lawsuits within the common law system of the nineteenth cen-
tury provided only slow, sporadic means to achieve these regulatory 
ends. Like their present-day descendants in the mass tort area, 
common law courts proved institutionally incapable of handling the 
large number of recurring cases needed to achieve coherent eco-
nomic regulation.153 The problems that industrial activity on a na-
tional scale posed, instead, demanded ongoing oversight on a long-
term basis.154 The response ultimately was not to tinker with the 
common law but to empower new institutions: namely, public ad-
ministrative agencies acting upon delegations of power from a na-
tional Congress. 
The evolution of streamlined solutions to regulatory problems 
did not stop with the creation of administrative agencies. Over the 
course of this century, agencies themselves have moved increasingly 
away from ad hoc, individualized adjudications - typically, en-
forcement proceedings against particular entities - as the primary 
means for setting regulatory policy. Instead, with the blessing of 
the courts,155 agencies have embraced the procedure of informal 
rulemaking, through which they promulgate detailed regulations 
that set policy on a prospective basis over a range of conduct.156 
Indeed, the shift from retrospective enforcement to prospective 
specification of conduct parallels the shift in the recent mass tort 
settlements from retrospective adjudication of individual tort claims 
to the development of prospective compensation regimes for future 
claimants.157 
In more recent years, rulemaking by public administrative agen-
cies itself has become a way to dispose of recurring kinds of dis-
putes without the need for repeated adjudication. In Heckler v. 
Campbell, 158 for example, the Supreme Court upheld the efforts of 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) to curtail sharply the 
need for individualized adjudications of disability benefit claims by 
153. See BARRY M. MrmlCK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGUIATION 28 (1980). 
154. See id. (cataloging the deficiencies of common law principles for purposes of 
regulation). 
155. That blessing came relatively early, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), 
where the Supreme Court held that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or 
by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the 
administrative agency." 332 U.S. at 203. 
156. On the shift from adjudication to informal rulemaking, see Antonin Scalia, Vermont 
Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and thi; Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. Cr. REv. 345, 375-82. 
157. Cf. MrmlCK, supra note 153, at 31 ("[T]he rise in administrative regulation has seen 
a shift from regulation 'after' to regulation 'before,' and has seen a rise in affirmative and 
active, as against passive, means of regulation."). 
158. 461 U.S. 458 (1983). 
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developing a grid through rulemaking procedures.159 Much like the 
compensation grids established by the recent mass tort settlements, 
the SSA's rule sets forth various recurring combinations of claimant 
traits and then specifies the agency's :finding as to the availability of 
jobs for such individuals in the national economy - a crucial varia-
ble in the agency's ultimate determination of eligibility for disability 
benefits.160 Outside the context of government benefits, agencies 
have similarly drawn upon rulemaking to reduce the need for indi-
vidualized adjudication over matters of economic regulation.161 
Like the recent mass tort settlements, the modem administra-
tive state comes with the risk that agencies may act in furtherance 
of their own bureaucratic agenda rather than in the faithful execu-
tion of their statutory mandate - for example, to endear them-
selves to those they are supposed to regulate or, perhaps, to a 
White House with political goals different from those embodied in 
regulatory statutes. This risk is simply another manifestation of the 
more general problem of agency costs.162 In response, the central 
enterprise of administrative law has been to develop ways in which 
to guard against the arbitrary exercise of agency power without 
cramping the agencies' deployment of expertise in pursuit of their 
delegated duties - not to put the genie back into the bottle but to 
make sure that he does not run amuck.163 Administrative law thus 
may offer an informative perspective to the analogous problems as-
sociated with mass tort settlements. 
A. Lessons From Administrative Law 
Over the last generation, the federal courts have developed 
what is by now a well-delineated framework for judicial review of 
159. See 461 U.S. at 470. 
160. This similarity has not gone unnoticed in the secondary literature. See Edley & 
Weiler, supra note 52, at 398 n.27; Robinson & Abraham, supra note 16, at 1500 n.58. 
161. See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964) (FPC limitations on certain price 
tenns in natural gas contracts); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.192 (1956) 
(FCC limitations on multiple ownership of radio and television stations). 
162. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Polit-
ical Control, 3 J.L., EcoN. & 0RG. 243, 246-48 (1987). 
163. Putting the genie back into the bottle no longer seems an available option. The 
Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), upholding the constitu-
tionality of the independent counsel statute, purports to sound the death knell for efforts to 
roll back the modern administrative state on separation of powers grounds. The wisdom of 
Morrison, however, does remain the subject of lively debate. Compare, e.g., Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judici-
ary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1208-15 (1992) (criticizing Morrison' on originalist grounds) 
with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1, 106-18 (1994) (defending Morrison on the same grounds). 
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rulemaking by administrative agencies. In large part, the current 
framework represents the outgrowth of debate during the 1970s 
over the role that judges should play in the review of complex regu-
latory decisions - whether judges themselves should develop tech-
nical expertise in order to scrutinize the factual premises of 
regulatory actions or, alternatively, whether the comparative lack of 
technical expertise on the bench counsels, instead, for a focus upon 
the decisionmaking process within the agency. The pointed ex-
changes in this period between the legendary D.C. Circuit Judges 
Harold Leventhal, taking the former view, and David Bazelon, ad-
vocating the latter, typified this discussion.164 By and large, it is the 
Bazelon view that comes closest to the current state of the law, 
although some flickering embers of the Leventhal approach still re-
main. The prevailing orthodoxy in administrative law is that courts 
need not become experts in the technical underpinnings of regula-
tion but, instead, should insist that rulemaking agencies employ a 
decisionmaking process that involves the searching and reasoned 
consideration of complex regulatory problems.16s 
The "hard look" doctrine encapsulates this approach to judicial 
review. The notion is that the agency must think seriously about 
the plausible approaches that the information at hand might sup-
port and then must explain the reasoning behind its selection of a 
particular course of action. In this way, courts have given meaning 
to the command of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to set 
aside agency action that is "arbitrary."166 As one leading source 
has put it: 
This approach to review of discretion is one that emphasizes process. 
The agency ultimately employs discretion to choose among relevant 
alternatives not foreclosed by statute. But it must develop fully rele-
164. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, J., con-
curring) with 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring); Friends of Earth v. Atomic En-
ergy Commn., 485 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (separate statement of Bazelon, J.) 
with 485 F.2d at 1034-35 (separate statement of Leventhal, J.). 
165. The leading paper to recognize this transformation in perspective remains Richard 
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 
(1975). 
166. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). Before asking whether the agency acted arbitrarily, 
of course, a reviewing court in administrative law must ascertain whether the agency's action 
passes muster under the now-familiar framework of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 
U.S. 837 (1984) - specifically, whether the agency acted within the bounds of the rulemak-
ing authority conferred by Congress. The notion is to link agency action to some delegation 
of authority from the legislature and, ultimately, to some source of federal regulatory power 
in Article I of the Constitution. In the context of mass torts, however, there is no obvious 
analogue to Chevron review; no one has delegated to the mass tort bar the authority to effect 
settlements of future claims through the vehicle of a class action. The absence of a Chevron 
analogue in itself raises significant questions about the legitimacy of mass tort settlements -
a topic that I explore infra in section III.C.2. 
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vant information concerning the effects of these various alternatives 
and the relevant considerations and interests involved in choosing 
among them. It must also explain and justify the alternative chosen in 
light of such information and considerations.167 
Where the agency provides such an explanation, the Supreme 
Court has noted that "the ultimate standard of review is a narrow 
one," such that "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency."16s 
The driving force behind this decisionmaking process lies in the 
participatory framework established by the APA for informal 
rulemaking. Specifically, the agency must publish a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking (NPRM) to apprise interested members of the 
public of its contemplated course of action.169 The agency then 
must afford all interested persons "an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments," and the agency must issue "a concise general statement" of 
the "basis and purpose" for its rule in light of these comments.170 
In short, the agency must call forth information and arguments that 
may undercut the premises of its proposed rule, and the agency 
then must address those criticisms. 
The Supreme Court's most famous application of hard look re-
view in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.171 illustrates the point. The litigation 
arose from the agency's decision to rescind a rule that would have 
mandated the inclusion of passive restraints in new cars of the then-
coming model year on the ground that its safety benefits did not 
justify its compliance costs to industry.172 The agency took such ac-
tion after years of wrangling under several different presidents, cul-
minating with the Reagan administration's decision to rescind the 
rule as part of its agenda for regulatory relief.173 
In State Farm, the Court overturned the agency's action as arbi-
trary. The Court pointed out that the agency had failed to explain 
167. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGU-
LATORY POUCY 363 (3d ed. 1992). 
168. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
169. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994). 
170. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994). 
171. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
172. See 463 U.S. at 38-39. 
173. See 463 U.S. at 34-39 (describing the history of the passive-restraint rule); see also 
463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The agency's 
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a 
different political party" that considers "public resistance and uncertainties to be more im-
portant than [did] ... a previous administration."). 
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why it had decided to scrap the passive-restraint rule in its entirety 
when studies in the rulemaking record called into question the 
safety benefits of only one kind of passive restraint: automatic 
seatbelts, which the agency feared would be detached frequently by 
drivers. The Court went further, however, to clarify that the hard 
look calls not only for simple consideration of such alternatives but 
also for an explanation of the factual premises of the agency's ac-
tion. On this score, the Court observed that - wholly apart from 
the possibility of relying upon other kinds of passive restraints, such 
as airbags or nondetachable automatic belts - the agency had 
failed to explain how the rulemaking record supported the crucial 
factual premise upon which it had based its action: namely, the fear 
that detachable automatic belts, in fact, would be detached in 
droves.174 
The Court underscored that its demand was not for certainty 
where none could be had, given that the rule in question had yet to 
be implemented in the real world. Rather, the Court clarified that: 
Rescission of the passive restraint requirement would not be arbitrary 
and capricious simply because there was no evidence in direct support 
of the agency's conclusion. It is not infrequent that the available data 
do not settle a regulatory issue, and the agency must then exercise its 
judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to 
a policy conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in a complex soci-
ety must account for uncertainty, however, does not imply that it is 
sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms "substantial uncer-
tainty" as a justification for its actions .... [T]he agency must explain 
the evidence which is available, and must offer a "rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made."175 
The kind of agency rationality the hard look envisions is not de-
sirable simply for its own sake. Rather, the hard look embodies an 
implicit recognition that agencies seldom act arbitrarily in the sense 
of determining their course of action by a roll of the dice; instead, in 
seeking to advance their own bureaucratic agenda, agencies may 
take action that undervalues considerations that Congress meant to 
carry weight in administrative decisionmaking. In the underlying 
statute at issue in State Farm, for example, "Congress intended 
safety to be the pre-eminent factor" in the agency's choice of stan-
174. The Court observed that the agency itself had accounted for the low rate for usage of 
existing manual seatbelts by reference to inertia - the need for drivers to buckle up in order 
for manual belts to enhance safety. The Court pointed out, however, that this same factor of 
inertia "works in favor of, not against, the use of" automatic seatbelts, which require an 
affirmative act on the part of the driver to disable them. 463 U.S. at 54. 
175. 463 U.S. at 52 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)). 
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<lards for automobile design.176 By examining whether the agency 
has offered a "rational connection between the facts found and 
choice made," the courts may detect when the agency has skewed 
its analysis of information in the rulemaking record in such a way as 
to give less weight to "pre-eminent" considerations, such as safety, 
and more to other factors, such as the plight of the auto industry.177 
Indeed, one may understand the emphasis upon safety in the 
rulemaking statute in State Farm as a way for the prevailing political 
coalition in Congress to ensure fidelity by the rulemaking agency -
in short, to "create pressures on [the] agenc[y] that replicate the 
political pressures applied when the relevant legislation was en-
acted" and, in so doing, "to enhance the durability of the bargain 
struck among members of the coalition."178 In this way, judicial de-
mands for reasoned decisionmaking serve to guard against precisely 
the kinds of infidelities that lie at the core of the agency cost prob-
lem in administrative law. 
B. Application to Review of Mass Tort Settlements 
In evaluating the fairness of a mass tort settlement under Rule 
23( e ), courts should draw upon the foregoing framework for judi-
cial review in administrative law. In other words, courts should an-
alyze the creation of private administrative regimes for mass torts in 
a manner similar to that already developed for scrutiny of their 
public regulatory counterparts. Here, I discuss the operation of 
such a system of review, first in a general overview and then with 
reference to both particular problems observed in the recent mass 
tort settlements and the prescriptions offered by other 
commentators. 
The sorts of agency cost problems that may arise with respect to 
mass tort settlements are amenable to an approach that turns upon 
a reasoned explanation of the settlement terms in light of informa-
tion on the expected results of litigation in the tort system.179 In 
particular, judicial review of mass tort settlements should employ a 
kind of notice-and-comment process to focus the attention of the 
settling parties and ultimately the court upon information that 
176. 463 U.S. at 55 (citing the legislative history). 
177. 463 U.S. at 52, 55; see Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 
HARV. L. REv. 505, 557 (1985). 
178. McCubbins et al., supra note 162, a.t 255; see also Garland, supra note 177, at 586-91 
(understanding State Farm as reinforcing norms of agency fidelity). 
179. I use the word "expected" in the economic sense of expected value, to encompass an 
adjustment for the uncertainty of recovery. 
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sheds doubt upon the fairness of the settlement terms. It would be 
far more difficult for class counsel to advance their own interests at 
the expense of the class if counsel knew that in order to obtain judi-
cial approval they must explain their decisions in light of contrary 
information. 
1. Overview 
Courts already have begun to touch upon the rudiments of such 
an approach, but they have done so without apparent recognition of 
its pedigree or exploration of its implications. Even before the ad-
vent of mass torts, courts confronted with settlements of class ac-
tions in more familiar settings - most prominently, corporate, 
securities, antitrust, and consumer litigation - spoke of their re-
view for fairness under Rule 23( e) as involving both a "substantive 
inquiry into the terms of the settlement relative to the likely re-
wards of litigation" and a "procedural inquiry into the negotiation 
process" by which the settlement was reached.1so 
A particular derivative action, securities fraud case, antitrust 
claim, or consumer class action is not like the others of its kind. In 
these areas, inquiry into the "likely rewards of litigation" must nec-
essarily center upon the progress of the particular class action in 
question prior to consummation of the settlement. The extent of 
discovery - into the merits of the plaintiff class's allegations and 
the potential obstacles to recovery in the form of legal defenses, for 
example - will be crucial where the class action in question is a 
unique event. In the mass tort context, by contrast, the class action 
is not a one-shot deal; rather, its objective is to resolve multitudes 
of future claims that come in recurring patterns. 
Courts should understand the first aspect of their review under 
Rule 23( e) to center upon the expected terms of compensation in 
the traditional tort litigation system - what the plaintiff class 
would sacrifice under a settlement. In contrast to conventional 
class actions, information on expected compensation terms need 
not be generated exclusively or even primarily through discovery in 
the class action itself but, rather, may stem from a preexisting body 
of experience - however slim - with the treatment of similar 
claims in the relevant mass tort stock market. 
180. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 796 (3d Cir. 
1995); see also, e.g., Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Natl. Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 682 (7th 
Cir. 1987); Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 
F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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Comparison of the settlement terms to tort recoveries does not 
turn simply upon the dollar amounts in the compensation grid, 
although that is certainly a significant issue. The inquiry also 
should extend, for example, to the medical criteria applied to claims 
under the settlement as well as to the noncash components of the 
compensation scheme - such as the insurance provided to 
unimpaired persons, limitations upon contingent fees for compensa-
tion claims, and so forth. 
This is not to say that judicial review will ascertain with clarity 
the outcomes that the tort system will produce. In the case of a 
settlement for a relatively mature mass tort like asbestos, courts 
may look - as did the district court in Georgine - to data on the 
levels of compensation that individual plaintiffs historically have 
obtained in tort litigation within the relevant disease categories.181 
In the case of a relatively immature tort like breast implants, histor-
ical experience in the tort system is, by definition, limited, and the 
range of plausible compensation levels may be quite wide due to 
uncertainty over the merits of the plaintiffs' case. 
The existence of a reference point in tort thus will not necessar-
ily yield clear answers, just as a judge faced with a settlement of a 
conventional class action "cannot really make a substantive judg-
ment on the issues in the case without conducting some sort of trial 
on the merits, exactly what the settlement is intended to avoid."182 
That substantial uncertainty may remain over how the settlement 
compares with outcomes in the tort system, however, does not 
mean that class counsel have carte blanche, just as an administra-
tive agency does not slip its leash merely by "recit[ing] the terms 
'substantial uncertainty' as a justification for its actions."183 Rather, 
courts should view the second component of judicial review under 
Rule 23( e) - review into the negotiation process that produced the 
settlement - as centering upon the manner by which counsel re-
solved such uncertainties.184 The oft-repeated truism is that settle-
ments that result from "arms-length negotiations" should be 
presumed to vindicate the interests of the plaintiff class.185 The 
181. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 277 ('l[ 95) (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
182. GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 796; see also Weinberger, 698 F2d at 74 (observing 
that Rule 23( e) cannot mean "that, in order to avoid a trial, the judge must in effect conduct 
one"). 
183. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983). 
184. Cf. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 74 (noting that the second component of review has 
arisen "[i]n order to supplement the ... necessarily limited examination of the settlement's 
substantive terms" due to uncertainty over the outcome of the litigation). 
185. See Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 74; see also, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 
151 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
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more difficult question is how courts should go about determining 
whether "arms-length negotiations" have occurred. 
Hard look review in administrative law offers an elegant solu-
tion to this problem. Specifically, courts should use participatory 
rights akin to the process of notice-and-comment rulemaking to call 
forth information and argumentation contrary to the settling par-
ties' agreement, to highlight uncertainties in the available informa-
tion and to elicit a reasoned explanation for the settling parties' 
choice of settlement terms. In this way, a conception of Rule 23( e) 
in the mass tort context along the lines of administrative law can tie 
together the two review components of which courts previously 
have spoken. When understood from the standpoint of hard look 
review, these two components are mutually reinforcing: the notice-
and-comment process that serves as the check upon the settling par-
ties' negotiation process also may act as the mechanism to bring 
before the court information that bears upon the substantive terms 
of compensation in the tort system. The inquiries into substance 
and procedure thus are simply aspects of a broader enterprise to 
ensure quality and fidelity in the decisionmaking that leads to a 
mass tort settlement. 
Moreover, such a process is particularly well suited to deal with 
concerns that go beyond the level and form of compensation. 
Other significant issues in mass tort settlements may center upon 
matters of claim projection, risk allocation, and disparate treat-
ment. Claim-projection issues go to whether enough money will be 
on hand actually to provide class members with compensation at 
the levels set forth in the grid. Questions of risk allocation raise 
related concerns over who bears the risk of error in these projec-
tions and the steps, if any, taken in the settlement to account for 
such risk. Issues of disparate treatment pertain to whether the set-
tlement makes arbitrary distinctions between members of the plain-
tiff class or, conversely, whether certain members of the class may 
have suffered from a failure to draw such distinctions. 
These sorts of questions are similar, at their core, to the types of 
regulatory decisions for which the courts have developed the hard 
look. They inherently involve decisionmaking based upon projec-
tions - perhaps simply educated guesses - of what the world 
would look like were a given action taken and about how such ac-
tion should be organized to achieve a desired result. To borrow the 
words of the State Farm Court, there may be "no direct evidence" 
on the matters in question; instead, they may call for the exercise of 
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"judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record 
to a policy conclusion."186 The goal is not for the reviewing court to 
demand mathematical precision where none is possible; rather, the 
point is for the court to insist that the settling parties grapple seri-
ously with the inevitable tradeoffs and uncertainties and that they 
offer a "rational connection" between the uncertainties they face 
and choices they have made in the settlement. 
Pieces of such a system already exist. The task for courts is to 
pull them· together within the overarching framework of hard look 
review: 
(1) Courts should conceive of the requirement in Rule 
23(c)(2) for the "best notice practicable" to the plaintiff class as the 
rough equivalent of an NPRM under section 553 of the APA.187 
Specifically, courts should understand the content of such notice to 
include not only a description of the settlement terms but also an 
explanation - akin to the preamble to a proposed rule - of the 
basic rationale and supporting information behind the selection of 
those terms. The goal should be to enable those with initial suspi-
cions about the settlement to have an informational base for more 
detailed evaluation of the settling parties' reasoning. 
Courts should not understand this preamble as a replacement 
for the kind of descriptions, written in plain language understanda-
ble to nonlawyers, used in the asbestos and breast implant settle-
ments. Quite to the contrary, in the interest of effective 
communication with actual class members, descriptions in plain lan-
guage should continue to be part of the "best practicable notice" 
under Rule 23(c)(2). 
The point is that courts should regard the target recipients of a 
detailed preamble to be interest groups concerned with the plight of 
class members. The notice campaigns for the recent settlements 
point in this direction by seeking to bring the settlement to the at-
tention of not only those individuals potentially within the class but 
186. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52. 
187. Compare FED. R. C!v. P. 23(c)(2) with Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b) (1994). The notion that private negotiations can give rise to regimes akin to those 
established through rulemaking by administrative agencies is not confined to the context of 
mass tort settlements. Several scholars have made similar observations with respect to con-
sent decrees under Tttle VII. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The Bar Against Challenges to 
Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees: A Public Choice Perspective, 54 LA. L. REv. 
1507, 1521, 1526-27 (1994); Maiman Schwartzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII 
Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DuKE LJ. 887, 934. 
See generally Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Mica L. 
REv. 321, 361-63 (1988). 
950 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:899 
also labor and medical organizations.188 In building upon this expe-
rience, courts should seek to draw upon the organizational skills, 
legal expertise, and fervor of interest groups as a way to overcome 
what otherwise might be barriers to collective action on the part of 
individual class members.189 
In administrative law, environmental and consumer groups long 
have played an indispensable role on behalf of regulatory benefi-
ciaries by exposing faulty reasoning by administrative agencies.190 
Indeed, such groups - already up and running - have begun to 
turn their attention to the distinctive problems that may arise when 
plaintiffs' lawyers enter into class action settlements on behalf of 
mass tort victims. For instance, Public Citizen Litigation Group -
a mainstay of environmental and consumer litigation in the admin-
istrative context - has been among the most vocal opponents of 
the recent settlements.191 
Mass torts often will implicate the concerns of existing interest 
groups due to the manner in which class members are exposed. The 
Georgine asbestos settlement has garnered the attention of labor 
unions due to its focus upon occupational exposure of industrial 
workers.192 One may expect the same for other mass torts that 
touch upon organized labor's longstanding concern with worker 
health. Another familiar example - albeit, one that did not in-
188. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
189. See generally MANcuR OLSON, THE Lome OF Cou.EcnVE AcnoN 11, 15-16 (1965) 
(providing an analysis of collective action problems). 
190. See PETERS. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PouCY 
(1994). 
Beginning in the 1960s, courts permitted additional categories of persons affected by 
administrative action to challenge its legality in court, including consumers, e.g., Office 
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(viewers' standing to challenge broadcast license renewal) and environmental groups, 
e.g., [Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)] ...• 
[T]he courts' rationale for these expanded rules of standing was that the relevant sub-
stantive statute reflected an implicit purpose to protect the interests of these litigants, 
and that this statutorily-protected interest was a basis for standing on par with tradi-
tional liberty and property interests. 
Id. at 810-11. 
191. For an account of Public Citizen's role by two leaders of that organization, see Alan 
B. Morrison & Brian Wolfman, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking 
Monetary Relief (Apr. 22, 1995) (Paper presented before the Institute of Judicial Adminis-
tration, New York University School of Law, Research Conference on Class Actions and 
Related Issues in Complex Litigation). 
192. In fact, the representative plaintiff who gives the Georgine litigation its name -
Robert Georgine - is the president of the Building Construction Trades Department of the 
AFL-CIO. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 261 ('ll 4) (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
For examples of unions in opposition to the Georgine settlement, see the listing of parties and 
their counsel in Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2532, 
at *3-*6 (E.D. Pa. 1995). (This listing is omitted from the opinion as reported in 160 F.R.D. 
478 (E.D. Pa. 1995)). 
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volve a settlement like that for asbestos or breast implants - is the 
active role played by Vietnam veterans' organizations in the Agent 
Orange litigation.193 
Moreover, apart from existing interest groups, a mass tort itself 
may give rise to the formation of organizations dedicated specifi-
cally to that subject. For example, the controversy surrounding 
breast implants has led to the founding of various groups to safe-
guard the rights of recipients, in addition, of course, to the many 
existing organizations concerned with the health of women.194 Liti-
gation over the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device spawned the 
same phenomenon of tort-specific group formation.19s 
Finally, a public interest law group funded by the plaintiffs' bar 
itself - Trial Lawyers for Public Justice - recently has announced 
efforts to fight class action settlements that it considers unfair.196 
(2) As a corollary to the foregoing point, courts should afford 
participatory rights in fairness hearings under Rule 23( e) compara-
ble to those available to interested persons in informal rulemaking. 
In the fairness hearing on the breast implant settlement, for exam-
ple, the district court afforded the opportunity to participate to all 
persons who wished to comment upon the settlement, "regardless 
of whether they had legal standing to be heard."197 Similarly, the 
district court in the Georgine asbestos settlement "granted all ob-
jecting class members full rights to participate in all aspects of [the] 
proceedings, including 'the right to appear through counsel, partici-
pate in the fairness hearing and conduct discovery.' "198 
(3) Courts should understand the fairness hearing under Rule 
23(e) to be a forum for examination of the settling parties' justifica-
tion for the settlement terms in light of comments from interested 
193. See SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 16, at 25-26, 37-57. 
194. See Don Lee et al., Twice Distressed, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at Dl (discussing the 
rise of organizations for breast implant recipients); Dow Corning Created the Tort Monster, 
WALL ST. J., June 8, 1995, at A13 (reprinting a letter on implant risks from Coalition of 
Silicone Survivors). 
195. For an account by the founder of one such organization, see KAREN M. HICKS, SUR-
VIVING TIIE DALKON SHIELD IUD; WOMEN V. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 73-96, 
119-26, 142-53 (1994). See also RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING TIIE LAW: THE STORY OF TIIE 
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 232-35 (1991) (describing the activities of the International 
Dalkon Shield Victims' Education Association); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 1024 
n.314 (identifying two additional groups specifically for Dalkon Shield plaintiffs); Vairo, 
supra note 140, at 618-19 n.6 (describing the Dalkon Shield Information Network as "per-
haps the largest support group for unrepresented Dalkon Shield claimants"). 
196. See Wade Lambert, Public-Interest Law Group Fights Some Class Settlements As 
Unfair, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at B4. 
197. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *l. 
198. Georgine v. Arnchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (quoting 
earlier order affording such rights). 
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persons. In the asbestos settlement, for example, the court heard 
"the testimony of some twenty-nine witnesses (live or by deposi-
tion) during 18 hearing days over a period of five weeks," including 
testimony from persons who had participated in the settlement ne-
gotiations, medical experts, financial experts, and several legal aca-
demics.199 Pursuit of an administrative law vision of Rule 23(e) 
does not, however, necessarily require extended trial-type proceed-
ings. In a world where courts reconceive of the settlement notice 
under Rule 23(c)(2) along the lines of an NPRM, there may be less 
need for lengthy courtroom proceedings to explore the factual justi-
fication for the settlement terms and any dissenting views. Instead, 
such matters might be dealt with primarily upon written submis-
sions in response to the "preamble" of the NPRM, albeit with sup-
plementation as needed through trial-type procedures involving 
witness testimony and examination. Here, courts might draw an 
analogy to so-called hybrid rulemaking in administrative law -
that is, situations in which Congress has required agency rulemak-
ing to follow a combination of procedures involving both written 
submissions and selected trial-type elements.200 
2. Particular Problems 
With this basic framework in mind, I tum to two broad catego-
ries of problems raised by commentators in connection with the re-
cent mass tort settlements to illustrate the virtues of judicial review 
on the foregoing model. Frrst, I discuss the special challenges for 
hard look review in the face of uncertainty concerning the number 
of future claims, such as may arise with respect to settlements of 
relatively immature mass torts. Second, I address the selection of 
counsel for the plaintiff class. Specifically, I analyze the merits of 
hard look review as compared to alternatives proposed by two sets 
of commentators who envision greater judicial supervision of the 
manner by which certain attorneys come to represent the plaintiff 
class. 
a. Claim Projection. The settlement of a relatively immature 
mass tort can represent a genuine compromise over questions of 
general causation, with both plaintiffs and defendants hedging 
against the possibility that science will subsequently tum against 
them.201 Developments in scientific knowledge may make the set-
199. 157 F.R.D. at 260; see 151 F.R.D. at 296-303 ('ll'l! 201-33), 306 ('ll'll 249-51). 
200. For general background on hybrid rulemaking, see BREYER & STEWART, supra note 
167, at 579-82 (citing statutory examples). 
201. See supra section I.C.2.b. 
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tlement seem like a good deal for one side or the other when 
viewed in retrospect, but they do not hold the prospect of precipi-
tating the alteration of compensation terms. For an immature mass 
tort, however, uncertainty is not confined simply to the element of 
causation but may extend as well to the number of claims that will 
be submitted under the settlement. Absent a substantial body of 
experience, it simply may be difficult to tell how many exposed per-
sons exist and when the latency periods for the relevant diseases 
will run. Uncertainty over claim projection - unlike questions of 
general causation - has the potential to wreak havoc with the 
compensation terms originally set in the settlement. An agreement 
to pay compensation at levels specified in a grid is meaningful, after 
all, only to the extent that enough money is available for the speci-
fied payments to be made to all who meet the medical criteria. 
Here, I briefly discuss how the problem of claim projection relates 
to the more general phenomenon of agency costs in class action 
settlements. I then explain how the collapse of the breast implant 
settlement due to claim projection problems illustrates the sound-
ness of an approach to judicial review drawn from administrative 
law. 
The distribution of compensation within the plaintiff class -
whether any particular claimant actually will receive what is prom-
ised in the grid - will be of little concern to class counsel who wish 
simply to obtain a fee award based upon the aggregate benefit to 
the class as a whole, the hours worked by class counsel, or a combi-
nation of both.202 These variables remain constant regardless of 
how many claimants ultimately share in the settlement pot. Even 
when counsel also wish to undertake the representation of clients in 
the aftermarket for claims under the settlement, reductions in the 
compensation paid to each individual claimant might be overcome 
through representation of more claims. In short, the focus upon 
fees, in whatever form, is unlikely to make class counsel sensitive, 
of their own accord, to uncertainty in claim projection. 
Judicial review along the lines of the hard look is especially well 
suited to deal with this problem. As an initial matter, the courts 
should draw upon the notice-and-comment process and par-
ticipatory rights in the fairness hearing to bring to light such infor-
mation as may exist to facilitate claim projection. The objective of 
this process is not necessarily to arrive at some definitive answer 
where there is none to be found but, more importantly, to provide 
202. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing methods for calculation of 
class counsel fees). 
954 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:899 
an indication of the degree of uncertainty on the subject. The more 
significant component of hard look review should lie in a further 
demand that the settling parties provide a reasoned explanation for 
the way in which they have accounted for such uncertainty in their 
agreement. 
One approach, taken in Georgine, simply would provide that the 
defendants remain obligated to pay all claims that qualify for com-
pensation under the medical criteria described in the settlement.203 
The question then will tum upon the prospective solvency of the 
defendants over the period covered by the agreement - a matter 
verified by the Georgine court with the aid of testimony from finan-
cial experts.204 Under this approach, plaintiffs will be no worse off 
than they would be in the event of continued litigation in the tort 
system; indeed, they might be better off to the extent that a resolu-
tion of tort liability in the form of a settlement may enhance the 
ability of the defendants to draw upon the capital markets to facili-
tate productive enterprises in the future.2os 
Defendants may be unwilling to assent to such an approach 
when the risk of error in claim projection is relatively high, as is 
likely to be the case for an immature mass tort. There nonetheless 
are other devices available to deal with uncertainty. Specifically, 
counsel might use the settlement agreement itself to generate better 
information about the number of claims while, at the same time, 
taking steps to afford flexibility to the plaintiff class in the event of 
precipitous reductions in compensation. 
The unraveling of the breast implant settlement, if anything, il-
lustrates the soundness of such an approach. Unlike the asbestos 
defendants who committed themselves to pay all claims that meet 
certain medical criteria, breast implant manufacturers originally 
agreed merely to provide a fixed sum of $4.2 billion to fund a settle-
ment.206 The use of a fixed-sum device accentuates the problem of 
claim projection, however, as the distribution of that sum in accord-
ance with the compensation grid is dependent upon the accuracy of 
such estimates. Indeed, the implant settlement provided for across-
the-board reductions in compensation levels - a technique known 
as "ratcheting" - in the event that the number of claims filed 
203. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 278 (<JI 101). 
204. See 157 F.R.D. at 286-91 ('Il'Il 142-70). 
205. See 157 F.R.D. at 291(<JI169) (citing expert testimony that the Georgine settlement 
will "significantly enhance the financial condition and prospects of" the settling defendants 
by removing " 'uncertainty, which adversely affects these companies' ability to access the 
capital markets, to raise debt in equity, or to attract people' "). 
206. See Lindsey (Sept 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *l. 
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within a specified time period would make it impossible to pay 
compensation in amounts anywhere near the levels set forth in the 
grid.201 Standing alone, then, a fixed-sum settlement in the face of 
uncertainty over claim projection carries huge risks for the plaintiff 
class. 
Based upon comments raised in the course of the fairness hear-
ing, the district court in the breast implant settlement focused its 
attention upon this problem.20s Judge Pointer initially noted that 
"no one has reliable data" with which to project the number of 
claims; indeed, the judge candidly acknowledged that he could not 
"even hazard a guess" in that regard.209 Judge Pointer nonetheless 
approved the settlement upon consideration of the manner in which 
the settling parties had addressed such uncertainty. Specifically, he 
noted that the settlement afforded class members a second opportu-
nity to opt out in the event of a ratcheting down of compensation 
levels.210 In other words, the settling parties in their private negoti-
ations were able to go outside the single opt-out framework of Rule 
23(b )(3) to develop a procedure through which they could begin "to 
obtain the missing information [on the number of claims]" while 
protecting the interests of the class.211 
The importance of this innovation cannot be gainsaid. Shortly 
after announcement of the breast implant settlement, it became 
readily apparent that the claim projections underlying the agree-
ment were highly inaccurate~ - so much so that the downward 
ratcheting of compensation would have left some members of the 
plaintiff class with as little as five percent of the amounts originally 
promised.212 To forestall the possibility of massive defections from 
the class through the second opt out, negotiations ensued to in-
crease the fixed sum committed by defendants, but the unexpected 
bankruptcy of Dow Corning derailed these efforts.213 Ultimately, 
several of the remaining, solvent defendants joined together to of-
207. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *22; Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 7. 
This process is not unique to mass tort settlements; inaccurate claim projections also have 
necessitated the repeated reorganization of the trust established in bankruptcy for persons 
injured by the asbestos products of Johns-Manville. See Findley v. Falise, 878 F. Supp. 473, 
477-88 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995) (tracing the tortured history of the Manville trust). 
208. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *20 (noting that "many [who challenged 
the adequacy of the settlement] are concerned that the defendants' contributions ... will not 
be sufficient to pay benefits at the levels shown in the [grid]"). 
209. Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *21-*22. 
210. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *22-*23. 
211. Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *23. 
212. See Money Shortage Looms in Breast Implant Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1995, at 8. 
213. See supra note 6. 
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fer a modified settlement that, at least, would provide a framework 
for compensation of women who received implants manufactured 
by those particular firms. Not surprisingly, this more narrow settle-
ment abandons the fixed-sum approach and, instead, would obli-
gate the defendants to pay specific amounts of compensation to all 
women who meet certain medical criteria - albeit, lower levels of 
compensation and more stringent medical criteria than under the 
original settlement.214 Such changes in the terms of compensation 
are understandable, however, in light of newly published epidemio-
logical studies that cast increasing doubt upon the causation ele-
ment of the plaintiffs' case.21s 
Commenting upon the breast implant example, John Coffee 
draws the odd lesson that coilrts should insist upon the inclusion of 
a second opportunity to opt out in mass tort settlements - essen-
tially, as a matter of course.216 This prescription confuses results 
with process. The objective is not for the court - without experi-
ence in the subject matter - to demand the inclusion of particular 
settlement terms. Instead, the breast implant example illustrates 
the way in which a court may structure a decisionmaking process 
such that settling counsel must grapple seriously with issues of claim 
projection. 
The beauty of the hard look is that it can guard against the 
shortchanging of the plaintiff class through erroneous claim projec-
tions while, at the same time, affording room for counsel to exercise 
creativity and innovation in the development of means to address 
the problem. A second opt out may be mutually acceptable in 
some situations; the :fixed-criteria approach in Georgine may work 
elsewhere; as-yet-unseen techniques may be appropriate in other 
areas. The point is not so much how the problem is addressed but 
that it either gets addressed in a reasoned manner tailored to the 
subject area involved or prevents a mass tort settlement from going 
forward at all. 
In this manner, the hard look has the incidental benefit of 
guarding against the prospect of settlements that come too early in 
214. See Meier, Revised Settlement, supra note 6, at A9 ("Under the new proposal, 
women can qualify for awards of $75,000 to $500,000 if they meet more stringent medical 
criteria. To do so, they would have to submit more medical documentation than required by 
the first settlement and could have to undergo new tests."). The manufacturers involved in 
this revised settlement are Bristol-Myers Squibb, Baxter Healthcare, and 3M. See id. In late 
December 1995, Judge Pointer approved this revised agreement. See Judge Approves Im-
plant Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at C2. 
215. See supra note 98. 
216. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1448-49, 1465. 
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the development cycle of mass torts. When issues of claim projec-
tion are so amorphous as to confound the negotiating skills of coun-
sel to fashion a solution that protects the plaintiff class while 
affording a modicum of repose to defendants, it is probably just as 
well to stick with the traditional tort system until more is known. 
The point is that these tradeoffs can be made by counsel, mindful 
that they will have to defend the reasoning behind any solution they 
might fashion in light of critical commentary. 
b. Class Counsel. Apart from problems of claim projection, 
commentators also have focused upon the way in which counsel 
come to represent the plaintiff class. They argue that courts might 
seek to address agency cost problems not merely through ex post 
review of the settlement terms but also by becoming involved ex 
ante in the selection of class counsel. Indeed, one approach implies 
that courts may avoid entirely the need for review of settlements by 
using an auction-based system to align the incentives of class coun-
sel and the plaintiff class before negotiations take place with de-
fendants.217 A second strand of commentary calls for courts to 
exercise control over the selection of counsel for the plaintiff class 
in order to prevent defendants from choosing as their negotiating 
partners some subsegment of the plaintiffs' bar that is willing -
indeed, whom defendants might induce - to sell out future 
claimants.218 
i. Auctions. The most imaginative of these approaches, devel-
oped by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, envisions the auc-
tioning of the right to represent the plaintiff class. Macey and 
Miller first developed their auction-based approach in the context 
of corporate and securities class actions and recently have explored 
the possibility of its extension to the mass tort area as well.219 They 
posit that a court might accept bids from various law firms - po-
tentially, even from the defendants themselves - for the right to 
represent the plaintiff class. The amount of the winning bid would 
go to the class and the winning bidder would receive, in exchange, 
the class members' rights of action against the defendants.220 
Such an approach would have the considerable benefit of align-
ing completely the interests of the plaintiff class in maximizing their 
217. See infra section III.B.2.b.i. 
218. See infra section III.B.2.b.ii. 
219. See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 10; see also Macey & 
Miller, Market Approach, supra note 10. 
220. See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 10, at 106-08; Macey & 
Miller, Market Approach, supra note 10, at 912-17. 
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recovery with the financial interests of class counsel - namely, the 
winning bidder who would now own the plaintiffs' rights of action. 
Indeed, such alignment prior to the commencement of settlement 
negotiations between the winning bidder and defense counsel - if 
viable - would tend to alleviate the need for judicial scrutiny of 
the resulting settlement terms. 
As a practical matter, however, an auction-based approach 
would not be workable in the mass tort context. First, the sheer 
amount of money involved likely would exceed the ability of even a 
consortium of plaintiffs' law firms to form a plausible bid - at 
least, absent revolutionary changes in legal ethics. The implant set-
tlement, for instance, posits the transfer of over $4.2 billion in com-
pensation to the plaintiff class,221 and even that amount ultimately 
proved too little. The Georgine court estimated that compensation 
under the asbestos settlement will run to over $1.2 billion.222 These 
amounts are several orders of magnitude greater than the sums that 
the plaintiffs' bar thus far has proven able to raise for purposes of 
defraying the fixed costs of mass tort litigation.223 
In the face of such amounts, prospective bidders might seek to 
raise money through the sale of equity interests - in essence, 
shares of stock - in the lawsuit that the winning bidder would be 
entitled to bring against the defendant companies upon acquisition 
of the plaintiffs' rights of action. Such a device, however, would 
entail sweeping changes in ethical principles that prevent the mar-
keting of financial interests in a lawsuit224 - far more sweeping 
than would be occasioned by Macey and Miller's original sugges-
tion that class counsel acquire such an interest because the equities 
here would have to be marketed to nonlawyer investors as well. 
Likewise, a prospective bidder from within the plaintiffs' bar 
might seek to borrow the necessary funds from lending institutions. 
In exchange, the lender would have to adjust the interest rate to 
account for the risk that the bidder ultimately might prove unsuc-
cessful in litigation against the relevant mass tort defendants.225 
221. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *l. 
222. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
223. Cf. supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing agreements to fund the 
development of generic assets). 
224. See generally Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. 
LEGAL Sruo. 329, 330-34 {1987) (discussing longstanding ethical barriers to the marketing of 
claims). 
225. In the commercial context, of course, an alternative to adjustment of the interest 
rate would be the retention by the lender of a security interest in some form of asset in the 
hands of the debtor, such as accounts receivable, industrial equipment, or valuable patents. 
By contrast, the assets of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar are unlikely to be amenable to such 
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The interest rate might be modest for a loan in connection with a 
class action over a mature mass tort, where the prospects for suc-
cess in litigation against the defendants may well be high. For an 
immature mass tort, the prospects for successful litigation would re-
main clouded with uncertainty, such that the lender would have to 
insist upon an unusually high rate of interest - in essence, a junk 
bond.226 The effect, once again, would be for nonlawyers to retain a 
financial interest in the law practice of the plaintiffs' bar - here, a 
financial interest in such alternative areas of practice as the debtor 
firm might pursue in order to pay off the loan, should litigation on 
behalf of the mass tort plaintiff class prove unsuccessful. 
Macey and Miller make a valuable contribution by questioning 
the ethical constraints on the financing of litigation. But, in an age 
of increasing distrust of the legal profession, it seems highly un-
likely that any change in legal ethics that realistically might occur in 
the near future would result in less constraint rather than more. 
Absent the ability of the plaintiffs' bar to tap the resources of 
nonlawyers, the winning bidder likely would be the defendant -
either directly or possibly through the financing of a bid by a partic-
ular plaintiffs' law firm of its choice. 
Even if a plaintiffs' firm could manage to assemble the requisite 
cash, formidable disincentives would remain to participation in the 
bidding process. A plausible bid still would have to set forth some 
mechanism to distribute the funds to the plaintiff class. Given the 
temporal dispersion of mass tort claims, this surely is not a simple 
task, unlike the typical derivative action where the bid simply 
would be deposited into the corporate treasury or securities litiga-
tion where the bid would be distributed in short order amongst the 
affected shareholders, as identified through brokerage records. 
Formulation of a compensation regime takes information about the 
various medical issues involved, the expected number of claims, and 
so forth - the kind of expertise likely to be built up only at a sub-
stantial fixed cost. The consequence could be that no one will bid, 
for fear that any effort to develop the requisite compensation re-
gime will be supplanted by other bidders who simply could pledge 
more money to increase funding across the board for any compen-
treatment. Apart from office equipment and the like, the assets of the plaintiffs' bar are 
largely reputational; they consist primarily of the ability to obtain new clients on the strength 
of victories for prior clients. 
226. The use of junk bonds as a financing device for bids would raise the ironic prospect 
of mass tort litigation resulting in bankruptcy to plaintiffs' law firms. 
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sation regime that might be put forward.227 Alternatively, the win-
ning bidder simply might be one who already has achieved a 
dominant position in the subject area through previous efforts to 
develop the requisite information for purposes of tort litigation -
precisely the sorts of plaintiffs' law :firms with whom defendants 
have bargained in the recent settlements. 
The upshot is that, in the mass tort context, an auction-based 
approach is unlikely to do more than re-create what private negoti-
ations already have achieved, if that. 
ii. Reverse Auctions. A second line of commentary also fo-
cuses upon the problem of class counsel selection and draws, once 
again, upon the image of an auction, of sorts. In separate papers, 
John Coffee and Susan Koniak decry what they see as the ability of 
defendants to select as their negotiating partners the members of 
the plaintiffs' bar who are willing to enter into the cheapest mass 
tort settlement.228 As Professor Coffee vividly summarizes the 
point: "At its worst, this process can develop into a reverse auction, 
with the low bidder among the plaintiffs ' attorneys winning the 
right to settle with the defendant. "229 Both Coffee and Koniak take 
as their example the Georgine asbestos settlement. In their view, 
the settling defendants not only selected class counsel in order to 
cut the cheapest possible deal, defendants also provided special 
benefits to class counsel for doing so. 
As noted earlier, the plaintiff class in Georgine consisted exclu-
sively of future claimants - namely, persons exposed to asbestos 
products from the defendant companies who had yet to sue in tort 
at the time of the settlement agreement.230 Persons who had sued 
by that date but whose cases had yet to be resolved - so-called 
inventory cases - did not come within the class definition and, ac-
cordingly, were not bound to the compensation terms in the settle-
ment. Coffee and Koniak correctly observe that the defendants 
effected settlements of the inventory cases represented by class 
counsel in a manner separate from the class action settlement and 
under different terms of compensation. 
227. Cf. WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 263 n.159 (quoting a letter from John Coffee raising 
similar difficulties with an auction-based approach); Macey & Miller, Market Approach, 
supra note 10, at 916 (acknowledging that "it would be necessary for a court to establish 
some type of claims facility with appropriate staffing and technical support"). 
228. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow 
Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995). 
229. Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1354. 
230. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257-58 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
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Specifically, Coffee and Koniak. note that, with respect to the 
inventory cases represented by class counsel, defendants afforded 
cash payments to persons who had yet to suffer impairment - pre-
cisely what the class action settlement does not provide.231 Overall, 
the inventory cases represented by one of the firms that served as 
class counsel, for example, received a total of over $138 million in 
compensation - fifty-four percent more in dollar terms than the 
roughly $89 million that the same cases would have received, by 
Professor Coffee's estimate, had they come within the class action 
settlement.232 Based upon this observation, Professor Coffee goes 
on to recommend, in effect, a per se rule against mass tort settle-
ments that define the plaintiff class to include only future claimants, 
not inventory cases pending in the tort system.233 In addition, he 
calls upon courts to exercise control over the selection of class 
counsel by establishing a steering committee - representative of 
the various plaintiffs' firms involved in the subject area - to con-
duct settlement negotiations with defendants.234 
The Coffee-Koniak critique is a challenging one. Indeed, the 
possibility that defendants might provide class counsel with lucra-
tive compensation terms for their inventory cases would mesh 
neatly with a cut-and-run strategy on the part of those :firms.235 The 
potential for such abuse and its effectuation are two different 
231. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1394; Koniak, supra note 228, at 1064-65. 
232. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1397; see also Koniak, supra note 228, at 
1067 & n.104 .. In addition to comparing the Georgine settlement terms with those afforded to 
the inventory cases of class counsel, Professor Coffee recently has made a second observa-
tion: that the compensation payments set forth in the Georgine settlement grid are markedly 
less than those in a seemingly similar grid developed in a separate proceeding for purposes of 
the Johns-Manville bankruptcy trust. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1395-96. 
Thus, for instance, Professor Coffee asserts that, upon "[c]omparing the two [grids], one sees 
that, in the ordinary case, a disabled victim of asbestosis will receive $50,000 under the Johns-
Manville [bankruptcy] settlement but only between $5800 and $7500 under Georgine." Id. at 
1396. 
That is simply untrue. The claims of all persons injured by the asbestos products of Johns-
Manville are subject to pro rata reduction to account for the limited funds available in the 
bankruptcy trust. See Fmdley v. Falise, 878 F. Supp. 473, 495 (E. & S.D.N.Y.1995) (prefacing 
the compensation grid with the caveat that claims are "subject to pro rata reduction"). As a 
result, the tort victims of Johns-Manville will receive only about 13.6% of the amounts indi-
cated on the grid. See 878 F. Supp. at 484. Moreover, even if one ignores these pro rata 
reductions, the comparison to Johns-Manville in no way undercuts the point that the com-
pensation levels in the Georgine grid accurately reflect the experience in the tort system of 
the particular asbestos defendants who are parties to that settlement - defendants whom 
Professor Coffee acknowledges to be differently situated than Johns-Manville. See Coffee, 
Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1396. 
233. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1455. 
234. See id. at 1454. 
235. See supra section 11.B (discussing cut-and-run strategy). 
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things, however,236 and the task of discerning between the two is 
one readily amenable to judicial review along the lines of the hard 
look. In particular, Coffee and Koniak's image of a reverse auction 
underestimates the constraints that flow from an open, par-
ticipatory process for review of mass tort settlements. 
At its core, the image of a reverse auction means that there 
must be losers - namely, counsel who would have some plausible 
claim to represent the plaintiff class based upon experience in the 
litigation at hand but whom defendants do not select as their nego-
tiating partners. The attraction of an approach to judicial review 
rooted in notice-and-comment rulemaking lies in its ability to draw 
upon the rivalries within the mass tort plaintiffs' bar to safeguard 
the interests of class members. Such an approach enables the "los-
ing" plaintiffs' firms to bring to light exactly the sorts of sweetheart 
deals for class counsel that a reverse auction might engender. In 
fact, the losing firms will have a powerful incentive to highlight un-
fair compensation terms given that they, unlike class counsel, will 
obtain no fee award whatsoever as representatives of the plaintiff 
class and, hence, will not have the opportunity to cut and run; in-
stead, they - like future claimants themselves - face the prospect 
of life in the aftermarket for compensation claims under the 
settlement. 
The mere possibility of opposition by rival members of the 
plaintiffs' bar, ironically enough, may well deter defendants from 
pursuing a reverse auction strategy in the first place, as such opposi-
tion will increase the barriers to judicial approval of any resulting 
agreement. An attempt to engage in a reverse auction, in other 
words, will sow the seeds of its own destruction where counsel ex-
cluded from the negotiating table remain free to object. 
The very example that Coffee and Koniak seize upon illustrates 
the operation of this mechanism. Here, details are significant, as 
they serve to illuminate the erroneous premises from which this line 
of criticism has proceeded. In the Georgine fairness hearing, 
Frederick Baron of the Dallas law firm of Baron & Budd led the 
charge against the settlement.237 The objectors even went so far as 
236. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 306 ('lf 252) (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
("The opportunity to collude is not enough for a finding of collusion ••. especially given this 
Court's thorough analysis of the fairness of the terms of the class action settlement pursuant 
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23."). 
237. Like class counsel, Baron too came to the proceedings as a "giant in the cause of 
asbestos plaintiffs," with two decades of experience in the litigation. Dale Russakoff, Asbes-
tos Pact: Legal Model or Monster?, WASH. POST, May 11, 1994, at A12. For an informal 
history of Baron's rise as an asbestos litigator, see Taylor, supra note 44, at 1, 9-11. In fact, 
"[i]n the 1970s, Baron and [Ronald] Motley, then in their twenties, separately unearthed 
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"to solicit opt outs all over the United States" through what the 
district court described as a "massive campaign" of "misleading" 
communications concerning the terms of the Georgine settle-
ment.238 Indeed, the court ultimately considered it necessary to in-
validate the opt outs believed to have resulted from this campaign 
and to take the unprecedented further step of affording the affected 
class members a new opportunity to make their opt-out decisions, 
this time based upon a court-approved description of the settlement 
terms.239 
Though certainly a vivid confirmation of the objectors' intensity, 
such misconduct is not essential to the operation of an administra-
tive model for judicial review. Wholly apart from the campaign to 
induce opt outs,240 Baron set forth in the Georgine fairness hearing 
precisely the reverse auction allegations described here, drawing 
upon testimony from no less than Professor Coffee himself, who 
appeared as an expert witness on a pro bono basis.241 
The fundamental problem with Coffee and Koniak's comparison 
of the dollar amounts of compensation lies in its failure to account 
for the noncash elements characteristic of mass tort settlements like 
that in Georgine: principally, the twenty-five percent cap on contin-
gency fees, the time value of money from speedier payment of com-
pensation, and the insurance afforded to as-yet-unimpaired persons. 
The question is not simply whether the inventory cases got more 
money; they should have. Instead, the question is whether the dif-
ference in the cash compensation received by the inventory cases 
over and above what they would have received under the Georgine 
settlement bears a reasoned connection to the other benefits af-
forded in lieu of cash. 
To answer this question, the district court took two approaches 
- both of which closely resemble State Farm's demand for the ar-
ticulation of a "rational connection between the facts found and the 
proof that key asbestos makers systematically hid the fact that their product was harmful." 
Russakoff, supra, at A12. 
238. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
239. See 160 F.R.D. at 518. 
240. There is no indication of involvement by any member of the legal academy in the 
objecting parties' campaign to induce opt outs based upon misleading descriptions of the 
settlement. 
241. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 310-11 ('ll'!l 278·82) (E.D. Pa. 
1994) (rejecting Coffee's testimony). Professor Koniak also testified, challenging class coun-
sel's conduct on ethical grounds, but the court rejected that line of attack as well. See 157 
F.R.D. at 302-03 (<Jl'l[ 229-33). On the nature of the testimony from both witnesses, see 
Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1343 n. * (pro bono ); Koniak, supra note 228, at 1045 n.t 
(paid). 
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choice made."242 First, the court called upon counsel who fash-
ioned the class action settlement to come forward with data on the 
amounts historically paid by the defendants for cases represented 
by class counsel in the tort system.243 The court then appointed its 
own special master to compare these data to the amounts of com-
pensation afforded to the inventory cases - an analysis that re-
vealed the two to be comparable.244 In short, the court used the 
historical data on defendants' settlements with class counsel in the 
tort system to ascertain that the inventory cases resolved in tandem 
with the class action had not received an unduly lucrative deal -
specifically, that they had not received a cash premium over and 
above that which the tort system historically provided in lieu of the 
noncash benefits afforded under the class action settlement. 
Second, the court drew upon findings earlier in its opinion -
again, based upon information developed during the fairness hear-
ing - to conclude that the nature of the noncash benefits under the 
class action settlement reasonably could account for the higher 
level of cash compensation paid to the inventory cases.245 Specifi-
cally, the court observed that compensation under the class action 
settlement would involve "considerably lower transaction costs, in-
cluding attorneys' fees."246 The reduction in attorneys' fees alone 
- from thirty-three to forty percent in asbestos litigation to a maxi-
mum of twenty-five percent under the settlement247 - would ne-
cessitate that cash compensation for the inventory cases be set some 
twelve to twenty-five percent higher for all disease categories sim-
ply to equalize the money the plaintiffs actually will receive.248 One 
reasonably may account for the rema4tlng difference between the 
242. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983) 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371U.S.156, 168 (1962)). 
243. See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 307 ('ll 254). 
244. See 157 F.R.D. at 307-08 ('ll'll 254, 259-63). The court's approach did not follow an 
administrative model in all its features, however, as the court did not make available these 
historical data to the objecting parties. See 157 F.R.D. at 307 ('ll 254) (noting that settling 
parties provided such data to the special master on a "confidential" basis). The court appears 
to have regarded its appointment of a special master as a substitute for adversarial review of 
the data. 
245. See 157 F.R.D. at 310-11 ('ll 281). 
246. 157 F.R.D. at 310-11 ('ll 281). 
247. See 157 F.R.D. at 285 ('ll'll 136-37). 
248. This estimate results from the following equation: 
(C,) x (1 - F,) = (Cs) x (1 - Fs) 
where: c, = compensation for inventory case 
Cs = compensation for same case under class action settlement 
F, =contingency fee applicable to inventory case (33-40%) 
Fs = contingency fee applicable to same case under class action settlement 
(25%). 
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cash compensation paid to the inventory cases and that afforded to 
the plaintiff class by reference to the insurance component of the 
class action settlement - a feature that the district court found to 
be absent from the terms afforded to the inventory cases.249 
Beyond the details of Georgine, the broader lesson is that hard 
look review - judicial insistence that proponents provide a rea-
soned explanation for the distinctions drawn in a mass tort settle-
ment - is capable of detecting the sorts of agency costs that may 
arise from the entrepreneurial interests of counsel. In particular, 
review on an administrative model provides appropriate incentives 
for settling counsel faced with a choice between pursuit of an early 
settlement, when little historical data may be available but where 
liberalization of causation requirements may be highly significant, 
and resolution at a more advanced stage, when the opposite may be 
true. Had the settling parties in Georgine been unable to draw 
upon historical experience in the tort system to support the reason-
ability of their inventory settlements, for example, a reviewing 
court might well have been unable to discern a basis for the differ-
ences in treatment afforded to those cases. Conversely, counsel 
may enjoy greater flexibility in the manner in which they structure a 
settlement when a body of historical data exists against which to 
check their handiwork. The point of the hard look is to leave the 
inevitable tradeoffs between structure and timing - in the first in-
stance - to those most intimately familiar with the nature of the 
litigation at hand. 
One potential response to this argument might be that Professor 
Coffee's call for judicial selection of a committee to conduct negoti-
ations on behalf of the plaintiff class nonetheless may serve as a 
useful measure to prevent abuse. Why rely on post hoc review, in 
other words, if one might prevent infidelities from occurring by 
fashioning a suitable "bargaining unit" at the outset? The problem 
249. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 311 ('l! 281) (noting that the insurance component - the 
prospect that "claimants with non-malignant conditions will be able to receive additional 
compensation if and when they contract cancer" - distinguishes the class action settlement 
from the terms offered to the inventory cases). Even if one had to account for the entire 
difference in cash compensation by reference to this insurance component, the allocation of 
$48 million amongst the 9777 nonmalignant cases in Ness, Motley's inventory - those in 
need of insurance to guard against the risk of cancer - would leave each such case with 
$4909 in cash. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1397 (difference in cash compensa-
tion is approximately $48 million); Koniak, supra note 228, at 1067 n.104 (chart depicting 
Ness, Motley inventory cases). That figure is not markedly out of line with the $3995 that the 
average American business pays annually to provide health insurance to an individual em-
ployee, see U.S. CHAMBER REsEARCH Crn., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 1994 EomoN: SURVEY 
DATA FROM BENEFIT YEAR 1993, at 17 (1994) - an employee, of course, with compara-
tively minimal exposure to asbestos and, hence, a lower risk of cancer than the typical inven-
tory case. 
966 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:899 
with such a view is that it overlooks the reasons why a settlement 
class limited to future claimants may be affirmatively desirable. 
Both Coffee and Koniak neglect to note that, upon MDL con-
solidation of federal asbestos litigation, considerable negotiation, in 
fact, did take place between a judicially approved steering commit-
tee representative of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar and their counter-
parts in the defense bar.250 Indeed, Frederick Baron - the 
eventual leader of the objectors in Georgine - was a member of 
the committee.2s1 The problem, as the Georgine court aptly put it, 
was that neither side could "get beyond the lowest common denom-
inator" within its own ranks.252 In the parlance of economics, this is 
a classic illustration of a holdout problem - a situation in which 
some subset of those involved in a collective negotiation are in a 
position to scuttle any genuine compromise that does not give them 
everything they want.253 Understood in this light, an inflexible re-
quirement that mass tort settlement negotiations be conducted, if at 
all, by a broadly representative steering committee of plaintiffs' 
lawyers would form a blueprint for holdouts. 
What actually happened in Georgine points the way out of this 
morass. Rather than consign everyone to more asbestos litigation 
in the tort system, the members of each camp who were willing to 
negotiate toward the creation of an alternative administrative re-
gime - the two plaintiffs' firms who came to serve as class counsel 
and twenty of the asbestos defendants - broke off from the hold-
outs.254 Such behavior certainly creates the risk of the reverse auc-
tion phenomenon that Coffee and Koniak quite properly fear, but it 
also gives rise to the prospect of a genuine compromise that may 
leave the plaintiff class better off than under the tort system - al-
beit, not to the full extent that every member of the plaintiffs' bar 
might like. Compromise is just that; it does not mean getting every-
thing that you want. 
One may best understand the decision to define the Georgine 
class to exclude pending asbestos cases as a way for the settling par-
250. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 265-67 (n 30-36); supra section I.C.1. 
251. See Andrew Blum, Asbestos Counsel, NATL. L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 2. 
252. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 266 (1 35). 
253. For allusions to the possibility of holdouts in class action settlement negotiations, see 
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 684 (7th 
Cir. 1987) ("[T]hree-cornered negotiations are clumsy at best, especially when one of the 
corners ... adopts an obdurate negotiating position."); and Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 
F.R.D. 141, 156 (S.D. Ohio 1992) ("[I]f this Court had required Class Counsel and the De-
fendants to include in their negotiations all attorneys representing absent class members, the 
negotiations probably would have deteriorated into a cacophonous clamor of voices."). 
254. See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 266 (1 35). 
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ties to solve the holdout problem. Such pending cases must have 
had legal representation in order to have been filed. Accordingly, 
had the class included all pending cases, class counsel would have 
had to include in the negotiations their holdout colleagues within 
the plaintiffs' bar, lest class counsel be guilty of "poaching" upon 
the lawyer-client relationships those rival firms had previously es-
tablished. It is one thing to effect a settlement of claims for future 
claimants; it is quite another - indeed, it probably would be tor-
tious255 - for class counsel to settle the claims of persons already 
represented by another law firm. 
The alternative that the settling parties in Georgine pursued was 
to exclude all inventory claims from the class action but to afford 
them a cash premium in lieu of the noncash benefits conferred by 
the settlement. Most notably, not only did the defendants afford 
such treatment to the inventory cases represented by class counsel, 
they also resolved, on similar terms, an equal number of inventory 
cases represented by firms unaffiliated with class counsel.256 This 
singular fact - not mentioned by either Coffee or Koniak - fur-
ther undercuts the suggestion of a sweetheart deal to induce the 
support of class counsel for the Georgine settlement; quite to the 
contrary, it is consistent with an understanding of the proceedings 
as a solution to a holdout problem. 
All of this is to say that hard look review - albeit ex post in 
character - offers a superior method to control the phenomenon 
of a reverse auction while, at the same time, preserving flexibility 
for those who are willing to fashion a genuine compromise free 
from the problem of holdouts. Those who might otherwise have 
scuttled a collective negotiation may serve a valuable role as critics 
in a notice-and-comment process, without being empowered to 
spoil all chances for a settlement agreement that may benefit the 
plaintiff class. 
C. The Limits of an Administrative Perspective 
Although judicial review on an administrative model represents 
a plausible response to the recent phenomenon of mass tort settle-
ments, the model is not without limitations. Here, I discuss the two 
255. Many courts have recognized a cause of action for tortious interference by a third 
party with an ongoing lawyer-client relationship. See, e.g., Cross v. American Country Ins. 
Co., 875 F.2d 625 {7th Cir. 1989) {Illinois law); Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt 
v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Terrlink & Bell, 138 Cal. Rptr. 670 (Ct App.1977); Sharrow 
v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 511 A2d 492 (Md. 1986). 
256. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295-96 ('ll'll 193, 196). 
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most prominent of these limits, which go to the interests of the re-
viewing court itself and to questions of legitimacy. 
1. Institutional Bias 
One significant difference between judicial review of rulemak-
ing by an administrative agency and review of a mass tort settle-
ment lies in the institutional interests of the reviewing court. In 
administrative law, the court can act as a neutral umpire, resolving 
disputes between the rulemaking agency and its critics. In the mass 
tort context, however, the prospect of a settlement that would re-
move future claims from the judicial system - and perhaps 
thousands of pending cases as well - has obvious institutional im-
plications for the court itself. In the extreme, a court exercising 
review under Rule 23(e) may have an incentive to rubber stamp a 
mass tort settlement simply to rid itself of such meddlesome 
claims.257 
This concern has some merit, although its impact easily may be 
exaggerated. First, if ever there were a case in which one might 
expect an institutional bias in favor of approval to be overwhelm-
ing, it would be a mass tort settlement in the asbestos area. The 
burdens of this particular litigation upon the dockets at all levels of 
the judicial system were well known prior to the negotiations that 
produced the Georgine settlement. A special committee of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, convened at the request 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist, painted an alarming picture in this re-
gard.258 Indeed, a cynic might see the Rehnquist Committee's re-
port and the MDL Panel's subsequent references to the prospects 
for settlement upon consolidation of the federal asbestos litiga-
tion259 as lending a degree of respectability to judicial bias in favor 
of settlement approval. Nonetheless, when properly understood, 
the fairness determination of the district court in Georgine was 
hardly a rubber stamp.260 
Second, to the extent that institutional bias in favor of approval 
can surmount judicial norms of self restraint, such bias is likely to 
arise at the appellate level to a far lesser degree than in the lower 
courts. The federal courts of appeals simply do not bear the brunt 
257. See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs''Attomey's Role, supra note 10, at 45-46. 
258. See REPORT OF THE JumCIAL CONFERENCE Ao Hoc CoMMITrEE ON ASBESTOS 
LmGATION 7-10 (1991) [hereinafter REHNQUIST CoMMITI'EE REPORT]. 
259. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
260. But cf. infra section III.C.2.a (discussing criticism of the Georgine court's analysis of 
class certification under Rule 23). 
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of mass tort litigation in the same way as the district courts,261 and 
that is all to the good when it comes to appellate review of decisions 
to approve mass tort settlements. The hardness of hard look re-
view, in other words, is a matter susceptible to correction by the 
courts of appeals, and the mere threat of reversal - with the possi-
bility that the whole matter will be thrown back into the lap of the 
district judge - can act as a deterrent to dereliction at the district 
court level. 
2. Legitimacy 
Were the risk of institutional bias by the reviewing court the 
only potential shortcoming of an administrative model, further de-
velopments probably would be unnecessary. The more troubling 
limitation of an administrative perspective, however, lies not in the 
inclinations of courts but in the central role that private attorneys 
play as settlement architects. Private attorneys may have expertise 
in a specific area of mass tort litigation akin to that of a public ad-
ministrative agency in a given field of regulation, but private attor-
neys simply do not have the same political legitimacy. The 
authority of an administrative agency to engage in rulemaking 
stems from a delegation of power from Congress which, in turn, 
traces its regulatory authority to Article I of the Constitution, In 
contrast, no one delegated to Ronald Motley and his cohorts the 
power to resolve mass tort litigation on a prospective basis.262 
The absence of such delegated power is precisely what has 
forced the mass tort bar to resort to the class action mechanism of 
Rule 23 in order to give binding effect to the settlements they have 
fashioned. The application of Rule 23, however, has not proven 
smooth. A crisis of legitimacy has manifested itself in two interre-
lated ways: first, in concern over the use of the class action device 
to effect a mass tort settlement when class certification might not 
have been warranted for purposes of actual litigation; and second, 
in lingering uncertainty over the basis for personal jurisdiction over 
261. The Cimino litigation offers a vivid illustration of the difference in perspective be-
tween circuit courts and district courts in this regard. District Judge Parker decried what he 
perceived as the Fifth Circuit's resistance to his efforts to streamline the disposition of the 
asbestos cases in his court through the use of aggregative techniques; indeed, he went so far 
as to remark blithely that he "should have caused thirty to forty identical appeals to have 
been processed in order to enhance the awareness level of the Court of Appeals." Cimino v. 
Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 8, 1995). 
262. See supra note 166 (discussing the absence of an analogue to the Chevron inquiry in 
administrative law, which asks whether the agency has acted within the bounds of its dele-
gated authority). 
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class members. These issues remain unsettled, with only a handful 
of courts speaking directly to either question thus far. My purpose 
here is not so much to resolve these issues but to explain how their 
very existence sheds light upon the limitations of an administrative 
model for mass tort settlements. In so doing, I seek to frame the 
terms for debate over the solution that I offer in Part IV as a way to 
alleviate such concerns. 
a. Class Certification. By its terms, Rule 23(b )(3) authorizes 
the certification of an opt-out class action upon a finding that 
"questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, 
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."263 The problem 
in the mass tort context is that such questions as may be common to 
the class are also likely to be bound up \vith differences in the com-
mon law of tort from state to state - differences that tend to un-
dercut the superiority of a class action as a device for adjudication. 
Indeed, the choice of substantive law to apply over large numbers 
of geographically dispersed claims is a question that has long 
plagued judicial efforts to resolve mass torts through active class 
action litigation. Some judges have sought to solve the problem by 
purporting to glean a consensus from the common law of the vari-
ous states, but such efforts quite properly have met with skepti-
cism.264 As Judge Posner has observed, any attempt by a federal 
court to apply "a legal standard that does not actually exist any-
where in the world" smacks of exactly the kind of general common 
law that the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins held to be 
beyond the power of the federal courts in diversity cases.265 
263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). This requirement of subsection (b)(3) accords with the 
general requirement in subsection (a)(2) that a federal court may certify a class action in any 
form "only if ... there are questions of law or fact common to the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(a)(2). 
264. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-02 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(issuing mandamus to decertify class action where district judge had envisioned trial of na-
tionwide products liability class action under a single negligence instruction); SCHUCK, 
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 16, at 128-31 (criticizing the concept of consensus law, 
one of several bases asserted by Judge Weinstein for class certification in Agent Orange 
litigation). 
265. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 
(1938)). But see Macey & Miller, Market Approach, supra note 10, at 911 ("Federal courts 
should jettison the unworkable Erie rule in the mass tort context and replace it with a ra-
tional approach that recognizes the necessity of federal common law in this area." (footnote 
omitted)). 
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An alternative approach that avoids the need to generate some 
"brooding omnipresence" of federal common law266 - albeit one 
that reduces the efficiency of the class action - is that taken in 
litigation over asbestos in the nation's school buildings. There, the 
Third Circuit upheld certification of a class action for litigation pur-
poses upon ascertaining that the relevant tort claims were reducible 
to four basic patterns,267 such as would make them amenable to 
trial through a series of special verdicts. 
At :first glance, the use of Rule 23 purely for purposes of giving 
effect to a settlement, rather than as a device to organize active 
class action litigation, would seem to offer a way out of these diffi-
culties. Under this view - endorsed by the leading treatise on 
class actions and explicitly adopted by the district court in Georgine 
- the element of commonality may be satisfied more readily in the 
settlement context; as the Georgine court put it, the question of 
whether the settlement is fair may, in itself, serve as the 
"predomina[nt]" issue common to the members of the plaintiff class 
as a whole.268 Judge Pointer appears to have taken a similar view in 
the breast implant settlement. There, he certified the plaintiff class 
only provisionally, pending approval of the class action settle-
ment.269 Again, the suggestion seems to be· that the settlement it-
self provides the requisite common issue - indeed, that the class 
action format might not work for actual litigation of breast implant 
suits. 
Such a view, however, begs the question whether the settlement 
should be before a federal court at all.210 The element of common-
ality is not simply a requirement for the convenience of the court -
one that goes merely to the workability of a class action trial and 
that may be more easily satisfied when a trial is not in the offing. It 
also implicates the justification for displacement of litigation in 
state fora by a federal class action - one capable of roping in non-
diverse claims as long as complete diversity exists merely between 
266. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
("The common Jaw is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of 
some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified."). 
267. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986). 
268. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 316 (IJI 7) (E.D. Pa. 1994); see 
also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 738-40 (4th Cir. 1989); 2 NEWBERG & CoNTE, supra 
note 124, § 11.28, at 11-57 to 11-58. 
269. See Lindsey (Apr. 1, 1994), supra note 119, at *3. 
270. Cf. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 797 (3d Cir. 
1995) ("To state that class members were united in the interest of maximizing over-all recov-
ery begs the question."). 
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the representative plaintiffs and the defendants.211 As Judge 
Edward Becker recently phrased the point outside of the mass tort 
context, the risk is that the class action device will "convert[] a fed-
eral court into a mediation forum for cases that belong elsewhere, 
usually in state court."272 Under this second view, the appropriate 
stance is for courts to safeguard the federalism aspect of Rule 23 by 
insisting that "actions certified as settlement classes must meet the 
same requirements under Rule 23 as litigation classes."273 In other 
words, mass tort settlements could not be effected for classes that 
would not pass muster under Rule 23 for purposes of actual litiga-
tion in a class action format. 
This second, more stringent view would not foreclose the use of 
the class action as a binding device for mass tort settlements, at 
least where the court can discern a manageable number of patterns 
in the applicable common law, such as would make viable a hypo-
thetical trial.274 Even this limitation, however, may not be enough 
to keep the federal courts from edging distressingly close to "medi-
ation for[ a]." It would be temptingly easy to conclude that a trial of 
a nationwide mass tort class action would be workable when one 
would not actually have to conduct such a proceeding. 
In short, reliance upon private counsel as the architects of mass 
tort settlements necessitates the use of a procedural mechanism 
that could, in some situations, threaten institutional values that go 
beyond the tort system. One, however, need not contort the juris-
prudence of Rule 23 to effect a resolution of these questions.21s If 
anything, the foregoing observations highlight the need for an alter-
native mechanism with which to give binding effect to mass tort 
settlements - specifically, a device that can draw upon the benefits 
of private negotiations between experienced counsel but that does 
not depend upon the invocation of Rule 23. 
b. Personal Jurisdiction. Similar considerations also lie behind 
the debate over the basis for personal jurisdiction in mass tort set-
tlements.276 The debate centers upon the steps necessary as a mat-
ter of constitutional due process to bind the members of the 
271. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
272. GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 799. 
273. 55 F.3d at 799; see also Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1456. 
274. See GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 799 (leaving open this possibility). 
275. One possible statutory response would be for Congress to revise Rule 23 in order to 
give explicit recognition to a lower legal standard for certification of settlement class actions. 
276. No court has turned away a mass tort settlement on grounds of subject matter juris-
diction. See supra notes 113 (exposed but presently unimpaired persons have standing), 115 
(prenegotiated settlement sufficient to constitute "case or controversy"). 
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plaintiff class to a privately generated regime - or, to put the point 
conversely, the procedural limitations upon the extinguishment of 
such persons' rights of action in tort through a judgment embodying 
the class action settlement. Challenges along these lines tend to 
arise not in the fairness hearing itself but afterward, when individ-
ual members of the plaintiff class who did not opt out under Rule 
23(b )(3) seek to sue the settling defendants in tort. The basic pat-
tern is for the district court to enjoin these state court tort actions to 
protect its earlier judgment affording binding force to the settle-
ment. The plaintiffs then challenge the injunction by arguing that 
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in entering the set-
tlement - specifically, that they lack minimum contacts with the 
forum in which the court sits and that they did not otherwise con-
sent to the court's jurisdiction. Indeed, such a challenge is currently 
pending before the Third Circuit with respect to an injunction of 
asbestos actions in state court brought against the defendants in the 
Georgine settlement.277 
Under current law, one confidently may say that such a collat-
eral attack is not available to persons who had reason to be aware 
of their past exposure and who received actual notice of the oppor-
tunity to opt out of the plaintiff class. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts,21s the Supreme Court squarely held that, at least with re-
spect to known members of a plaintiff class, those who receive ac-
tual notice but who do not opt out will be considered to have 
consented implicitly to the jurisdiction of the court over their per-
sons.279 The affording of such notice will provide all the process 
that is due as a constitutional matter.280 The open question today 
concerns the extent to which Shutts applies beyond the parameters 
of that case. The plaintiff class in Shutts consisted entirely of known· 
plaintiffs - identified persons who owned certain royalty rights 
against the defendant oil company.281 In finding implied consent in 
that situation, the Court expressly declined to intimate a view about 
personal jurisdiction in other types of class actions.282 
By definition, unknown plaintiffs cannot be afforded the kind of 
individualized mailing used to notify the royalty owners in Shutts. 
277. See supra note 6. 
278. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
279. See 472 U.S. at 811-14. The notion of implied consent in Shutts is not without its 
critics. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate 
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 16-19 (1986). 
280. See 472 U.S. at 812. 
281. See 472 U.S. at 799. 
282. See 472 U.S. at 811 n.3. 
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Nor are settling counsel likely to be in a position to prove conclu-
sively that such persons received notice through other means, such 
as the mass media, unions, or other intermediaries; indeed, as dis-
cussed earlier, one may best understand those devices to be di-
rected more toward the generation of information in a notice-and-
comment process than toward the affording of actual notice to indi-
vidual class members. In addition, some commentators have 
doubted the propriety of drawing an inference of consent when ex-
posed persons - even if they receive actual notice - have yet to 
ascertain whether they actually will become impaired.283 Finally, it 
is conceivable that a plaintiff class in a mass tort settlement might 
include at least some persons who do not even know that they have 
been exposed to the substance at issue. Such is obviously not the 
case with respect to breast implant recipients and probably not for 
persons with occupational exposure to asbestos sufficiently exten-
sive to cause an increased risk of future injury,284 but one nonethe-
less cannot exclude the possibility that the members of some future 
plaintiff class may be unaware of their exposure. 
The one decision to have addressed in any detail the applicabil-
ity of Shutts to unknown mass tort plaintiffs - In re "Agent 
Orange" Product Liability Litigation (Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock 
Chemicals Co. )285 - involved a collateral attack upon the settle-
ment that concluded active class action litigation over Agent 
Orange. There, the Second Circuit observed that " 'there was no 
easily accessible list of veterans' " exposed to Agent Orange during 
the Vietnam War, unlike the situation of the royalty holders in 
Shutts.286 Accordingly, as in the more recent agreements, notice of 
the Agent Orange settlement "was provided to class members by 
mail where feasible and by advertisements in the print and broad-
cast media."287 Nearly a decade after the settlement had received 
judicial approval, however, certain veterans - who apparently had 
not received individualized notice - sued in tort for injuries that 
they alleged "did not manifest themselves or were not discovered" 
283. See Koniak, supra note 228, at 1086-87. 
284. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding 
that "after more than 20 years of extensive litigation, over 15 bankruptcies (many with exten-
sive notice), and massive publicity about asbestos, persons who have had occupational expo-
sure to asbestos are aware of that exposure"). 
285. 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994). 
286. 996 F.2d at 1435 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 169 
(2d Cir. 1987)). 
287. 996 F.2d at 1429. 
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until after the settlement date.288 Ivy, in short, presents the difficult 
case of unknown plaintiffs with subsequently manifested injuries. 
The Second Circuit recognized that the implied consent theory 
of Shutts was inapplicable to these plaintiffs' collateral attack, but 
the court nonetheless declined to limit the settlement only to those 
veterans who had received individualized notice. Rather, the court 
reasoned that: 
In the instant case, society's interest in the efficient and fair reso-
lution of large-scale litigation outweighs the gains from individual no-
tice and opt-out rights, whose benefits here are conjectural at best .... 
[P]roviding individual notice and opt-out rights to persons who are 
unaware of an injury would probably do little good. Their rights are 
better served, we think, by requiring that "fair and just recovery pro-
cedures be[] made available to these claimants," ... and by ensuring 
that they receive vigorous and faithful vicarious representation.289 
Under this view, Shutts represents a rule of preference: for those 
class members who can be identified, due process demands individ-
ualized notice. But this does not mean that the Due Process Clause 
is violated when a court binds unknown plaintiffs to a settlement in 
the absence of such notice. Rather, the process due to the latter 
category of plaintiffs lies not in affording them the opportunity to 
consent when they may not be in a position to make such a decision 
but, instead, in judicial review of the settlement terms and .the pro-
cess by which those terms were reached. 
Although the Second Circuit thus purported to avoid reliance 
upon the notion of implied consent in Shutts, the court's under-
standing of due process nonetheless involves the implication of con-
sent in a deeper sense. The unarticulated subtext of Ivy seems to be 
that, even when one cannot reliably draw an inference of consent 
based upon inaction on the part of each individual class member a 
la Shutts, one nonetheless may infer consent of a broader, Rawlsian 
sort: if only it were possible for everyone to bargain in advance of a 
mass tort - without anyone knowing his or her ultimate status as a 
mass tort victim, a mass tortfeasor, or neither - then everyone 
would consent to a system in which mass tort settlements could re-
solve the rights of unknown class members, with the assurance that 
the courts will act as a check upon abuse by class counsel.290 Ivy, in 
other words, rests upon a notion of implied consent not to a partic-
288. 996 F.2d at 1430. 
289. 996 F.2d at 1435 (quoting 1 NEWBERG & CoNTE, supra note 124, § 1.23, at 1-56). 
290. Cf. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE 11-22 (1971) (positing such bargaining from 
"the original position" as a criterion for justice). 
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ular settlement but, instead, to a broader framework by which set-
tlements may be reached in the mass tort area generally. 
Whether this theory of consent ultimately would be enough to 
satisfy constitutional due process is a matter I leave to others. My 
point here is that the viability of mass tort settlements in the future 
need not await the resolution of this question, just as it need not 
await a solution to problems of class certification under Rule 23. 
Rather than rely upon a court's guess about how people would bar-
gain behind the proverbial veil of ignorance, there is a more reliable 
means by which to approximate what such bargaining would pro-
duce: specifically, Congress should consider the possibility of build-
ing upon recent experience by developing a statutory regime for 
mass tort settlement negotiations that is independent from Rule 23 
but that provides for judicial review of any resulting agreements. 
As a starting point for such discussions, I sketch a few suggestions 
to guide this next step in the transformation from tort to 
administration. 
IV. AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC LAW 
To say that Congress should develop a statutory regime for mass 
tort settlements does not mean that it must replace private adminis-
trative compensation systems with a large scale public bureaucracy. 
The rise of mass tort settlements, if anything, should serve as a re-
joinder to claims that big problems in the law necessarily require 
big government. Indeed, one of the significant attractions of pri-
vate compensation systems designed on a tort-by-tort basis is that 
they are less likely than public agencies to linger on for years after 
accomplishment of their basic mission. Instead, the statutory re-
gime that I envision would place the government not in the capacity 
of dictating solutions to mass torts but, instead, in a role of facilitat-
ing private agreements to address such problems. The key is simply 
to replace the binding device of a Rule 23 class action with Article I 
regulatory authority. 
Here, Congress should draw upon insights from the Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act of 1990.291 The notion behind the Act is to pro-
vide an alternative to the conventional rulemaking process for pub-
291. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994). The Act developed from both academic commentary and 
experimentation by rulemaking agencies. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A 
Cure For Malaise, 71 GEO. LJ. 1 (1982) (offering the earliest and most complete articulation 
of the case for negotiated rulemaking); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory 
and Practice of Negotiated Ru/emaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985) (describing experi-
mentation by EPA). For general background on the operation of the Act, see ADMINISTRA· 
TIVE CONFERENCE OF TIIE U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (1990). 
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lie administrative agencies. Specifically, the Act establishes a 
framework for the formulation of agency rules through a process of 
negotiation amongst those who would be affected thereby - both 
regulated interests and regulatory beneficiaries - in order to avoid 
the prospect of "expensive and time-consuming litigation" in court 
over the validity of the final rule.292 In this regard, the Act is part 
of the broader movement toward alternative dispute resolution in 
the law as a whole - one that reflects the same sorts of dissatisfac-
tions with traditional litigation as have become painfully evident in 
the mass tort context. 
For present purposes, the central concept of the Act is that an 
administrative agency may discharge its rulemaking responsibilities 
by focusing upon areas in which a "limited number of identifiable 
interests" will be affected by a rule, by convening a committee of 
persons who represent those interests, and by using the results of 
the committee negotiations as the basis for issuance of an agency 
rule for notice and comment.293 In its final form, a rule formulated 
through negotiated rulemaking remains subject to judicial review in 
the same manner as if it had resulted from conventional rulemaking 
procedures under the APA.294 
A similar approach in the mass tort area holds the promise of 
retaining the benefits of private negotiation - experience in the 
subject area and ready access to information on claim values in the 
relevant mass tort stock market - while, at the same time, sur-
mounting concerns of class certification and personal jurisdiction. 
Specifically, a government agency might draw upon the results of 
private negotiations - much like those that occurred over asbestos 
and breast implants - to promulgate regulations that would estab-
lish a compensation program funded by defendants for persons in-
jured by a particular mass tort. 
Such a solution modeled after negotiated rulemaking need not 
displace the status quo, wherein those who effect a mass tort settle-
ment must deal with the doctrinal uncertainties of Rule 23. To the 
contrary, the prospect that a government agency might find the 
compensation terms formulated by private counsel to be unfair -
292. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, §§ 2(2), (4), 104 Stat. 
4969, 4969 (congressional findings). 
293. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (1994). The agency, of course, may draw upon the results of 
the committee's negotiations only "to the maximum extent possible consistent with [its] legal 
obligations." 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) (1994). 
294. See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994) (providing that the negotiated rule "shall not be accorded 
any greater deference by a court than a rule which is the product of other rulemaking 
procedures"). 
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such that counsel would be consigned to pursue their deal, if at all, 
through the more shaky device of Rule 23 - can serve to enhance 
the constraints upon such counsel. If they want the additional 
"bang" afforded by imprimatur of a regulatory agency, they will 
need to persuade the agency about the virtues of the deal they have 
wrought. And that would be all to the good. 
To create such a framework, Congress would need to assert a 
federal regulatory interest under the Commerce Clause over the 
disposition of mass tort claims - even those that would not other-
wise come within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. A 
number of commentators previously have identified the need for 
some form of national legislation to deal specifically with asbestos 
litigation, without expressing any doubts about the legal basis for 
such legislation.295 Moreover, pending bills that would impose fed-
eral statutory limitations upon product liability claims at common 
law suggest that such federal intervention is no longer taboo as a 
policy matter.296 If anything, the federal interest in mass torts is 
significantly stronger: the barriers to consolidation of geographi-
cally dispersed claims for orderly resolution in a single proceeding 
fairly cry out for a solution at the national level in much the same 
way as the problems of interstate corporate activity demanded a 
coordinated, national response earlier in this century. Indeed, the 
assertion of federal authority that I envision would be tailored pre-
cisely to the federal interest in question: nondiverse tort cases in 
the state courts would be affected only when necessary to facilitate 
a binding national solution to a particular mass tort problem. In 
short, the assertion of a federal regulatory interest over mass torts 
would not implicate the current debate over the application of the 
Commerce Clause to activities that do not substantially affect inter-
state commerce.297 
As to the allocation of regulatory authority within the federal 
government, Congress would be best served by preserving a degree 
of flexibility. A mass tort centered upon a medical device like 
breast implants appropriately might come within the expertise of 
the FDA - the agency that originally licensed that product -
295. See REHNQUIST COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 258, at 27-35; Lester Brickman, 
The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 
CARDOZO L. REv. 1891 (1992); Edley & Weiler, supra note 52, at 397-401. 
296. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposed Product Liability Fairness Act 
of 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S6407 (daily ed. May 10, 1995). 
297. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down a federal statute 
criininalizing handgun possession within a school zone on the grounds that it was outside the 
scope of the Commerce Clause). 
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whereas a mass tort focused primarily upon the occupational set-
ting, like asbestos, might call for the Department of Labor. To al-
low such matchmaking on a tort-by-tort basis, Congress might 
simply delegate regulatory authority to the President, who in tum 
could pass the baton to the appropriate agency as the circumstances 
warrant.298 
In addition, Congress would need to delineate a mechanism for 
identification of mass torts that are potentially amenable to a nego-
tiated solution at the national level. One possible solution would be 
to draw upon recent experience with the MDL Panel - specifi-
cally, to predicate federal regulatory authority upon the existence 
of a determination by that Panel to consolidate federal litigation 
over a particular mass tort in a single forum. In essence, the MDL 
Panel's determination would serve as an appropriate indication that 
mass tort litigation in a particular area has progressed to a sufficient 
degree to warrant consideration of a solution through the regula-
tory equivalent of a mass tort settlement. MDL consolidation thus 
would form a necessary condition for agency action but would not 
give rise to an affirmative requirement for the agency to convene a 
negotiating committee. Rather, the agency still might exercise dis-
cretion as to whether displacement of tort litigation would be pre-
mature - for instance, due to problems of claim projection. 
The prospect that a public agency will serve as the facilitator for 
private negotiations can serve as a supplemental check upon agency 
cost problems - one that remains free from the kinds of institu-
tional self-interest to which courts might be susceptible. As under 
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, the agency would have initial au-
thority to select the negotiators to represent the various affected 
interests. In the event of an impasse, the agency then could deter-
mine whether to press forward with some reconstituted subset of 
the committee in order to surmount a holdout problem or, alterna-
tively, to regard the particular impasse as a safeguard against a re-
verse auction. The task of distinguishing between the two situations 
is a matter that might rest with the discretion of the agency on a 
tort-by-tort basis. 
298. The statutory scheme that I envision would not contravene the strictures of the 
nondelegation doctrine upon the conferring of regulatory authority upon private parties. See 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936) (striking down statute authorizing coal 
companies and workers to set wage and hour regulations for their industry). As in the Nego-
tiated Rulemaking Act, the relevant public administrative agency would retain the ultimate 
power to determine whether to issue as a binding regulation the compensation scheme devel-
oped by the negotiating committee. See Harter, supra note 291, at 107-09. 
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Even when negotiations do bear fruit, the agency might make 
use of the regulatory equivalent of a Rule 23(b )(3) opt-out proce-
dure. In this way, the prospect of continued litigation in the tort 
system - in the event that large numbers of exposed persons re-
gard the compensation terms in the negotiated rule as too stingy 
and, accordingly, exercise their option to opt out - still can serve 
as an important check upon the negotiation process fostered by the 
agency in much the same way as it has done in the class action 
context. 
In framing the standards for judicial review of the resulting reg-
ulation, Congress might borrow the existing "arbitrary or capri-
cious" standard of the APA, understood in light of hard look 
jurisprudence. In this way, Congress simply would build upon ex-
isting law, albeit with an explicit grounding in principles of adminis-
trative law rather than the current incorporation of hard look 
principles into Rule 23( e) sub silentio. 
To say that an agency should issue regulations to create a com-
pensation regime for particular mass torts is not to say that the 
agency itself must also take on the day-to-day administration of that 
regime. Rather, one might understand the agency regulations sim-
ply as defining a set of federal property rights for mass tort victims 
as against mass tortfeasors - or, more accurately, of substituting 
such rights, as defined in the regulations generated by the negotiat-
ing committee, for the plaintiffs' common law rights of action in 
tort.299 Having detailed the compensation to be paid for particular 
medical conditions, the agency need not involve itself in the adjudi-
cation of claims invoking those rights, at least as an initial matter. 
Rather, the agency might retain oversight authority regarding the 
compensation regime in the manner of an auditor, but it may leave 
the routine administration of individual compensation claims in pri-
vate hands, as in the asbestos and breast implant examples. 
In short, future debate should . not frame the issues for public 
lawmakers in terms of a stark choice between litigation-based solu-
tions, on the one hand - whether of the traditional tort variety or 
based upon Rule 23 class actions - and reliance entirely upon gov-
ernmental solutions, on the other. Rather, Congress may build 
upon the lessons of the recent mass tort settlement~ to fashion a 
middle option, one that may capture the benefits of a privately ne-
gotiated and administered compensation regime but that relies 
299. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (noting that "a chose in 
action is a constitutionally recognized property interest"). 
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upon the regulatory authority of government for its binding force 
and upon judicial review to guard against the problem of agency 
costs. The objective, in other words, is to draw forth the unique 
strengths of several different institutions - the private bar, public 
agencies, and the courts - to fashion, in tandem with each other, 
fair and workable solutions to mass torts. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent settlements for asbestos and breast implants repre-
sent a marked departure from previous efforts to adapt the com-
mon law litigation system to the phenomenon of mass torts. Rather 
than tinker with the common law at the margins, the recent settle-
ments posit the creation of distinctive new institutions to address 
the equally distinctive features of mass torts. Though undoubtedly 
novel in the area of tort law, these institutions bear striking similari-
ties to public administrative agencies, both in their streamlined ap-
proach to compensation and in the agency cost problems that they 
may engender. 
In the immediate future, courts should organize their analysis of 
mass tort settlements under Rule 23( e) along the lines of judicial 
review in administrative law. Specifically, by insisting upon rea-
soned justification for the features of such settlements in the man-
ner of hard look review over notice-and-comment rulemaking, the 
courts can act as a check upon the agency costs that may arise from 
the entrepreneurial interests of class counsel. In particular, hard 
look review offers a solution superior to the regime of per se rules 
suggested by commentators such as Professor Coffee. 
More broadly, the recent settlements should serve as a predicate 
for future elaboration by Congress in the form of a general statu-
tory framework for the resolution of mass torts modeled upon the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act. In this way, Congress may take the 
next step in the transformation from tort to administration. 
